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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TRAJECTORY PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN MOBILE WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS
by
Xinyu Jin
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor
In recent years, there has been an enormous growth of location-aware devices, such
as GPS embedded cell phones, mobile sensors and radio-frequency identification
tags. The age of combining sensing, processing and communication in one device,
gives rise to a vast number of applications leading to endless possibilities and a re-
alization of mobile Wireless Sensor Network (mWSN) applications. As computing,
sensing and communication become more ubiquitous, trajectory privacy becomes a
critical piece of information and an important factor for commercial success. While
on the move, sensor nodes continuously transmit data streams of sensed values and
spatiotemporal information, known as “trajectory information”. If adversaries can
intercept this information, they can monitor the trajectory path and capture the
location of the source node.
This research stems from the recognition that the wide applicability of mWSNs
will remain elusive unless a trajectory privacy preservation mechanism is developed.
The outcome seeks to lay a firm foundation in the field of trajectory privacy preser-
vation in mWSNs against external and internal trajectory privacy attacks. First,
to prevent external attacks, we particularly investigated a context-based trajectory
privacy-aware routing protocol to prevent the eavesdropping attack. Traditional
shortest-path oriented routing algorithms give adversaries the possibility to locate
vi
the target node in a certain area. We designed the novel privacy-aware routing phase
and utilized the trajectory dissimilarity between mobile nodes to mislead adversaries
about the location where the message started its journey. Second, to detect internal
attacks, we developed a software-based attestation solution to detect compromised
nodes. We created the dynamic attestation node chain among neighboring nodes
to examine the memory checksum of suspicious nodes. The computation time for
memory traversal had been improved compared to the previous work. Finally, we
revisited the trust issue in trajectory privacy preservation mechanism designs. We
used Bayesian game theory to model and analyze cooperative, selfish and malicious
nodes’ behaviors in trajectory privacy preservation activities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the field of location-aware sensing devices has been rapidly expand-
ing. The age of combining sensing environments, processing data and communi-
cation in one device, is expected to bring an enormous increase of location-aware
applications. Along with the novel applications, a new class of sensor networks, mo-
bile Wireless Sensor Networks (mWSNs), is emerging. While on the move, sensors
continuously transmit data streams of sensed values and spatiotemporal information,
known as “trajectory information”. However, the mobile sensors, which compose
such networks, are susceptible to trajectory privacy and security attacks by an ad-
versary tracking the devices over time and space.
Sensors are small battery-powered wireless devices, which are equipped with
limited processing power and memory. Sensor network related issues are unique
and application-dependent. This includes prolonging network lifetime and security
where adversarial environments pose various kinds of threats to reliable network
operations. These constraints raise the issue that some of the techniques proposed
in existing studies may not be applicable to mWSNs.
1.1 Motivating Applications
This research is aimed to develop an inherent TPP mechanism for mWSNs that can
be used for military, civilian safety, and a vast variety of other applications with de-
vices that have limited resources. For example, aerial sensors are deployed in public
places to monitor air pollution level or detect toxic gas leaking for public safety.
For natural disaster forecasting, mobile sensors are deployed in unattended severe
environments to track changes in humidity, temperature, wind speed, and other
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parameters. Sensors could be mobile by being either self-propelled or attached to
moving objects. For instance, they could be carried by remotely controlled robots
or human beings to reach the optimized location for phenomena monitoring. In the
infrastructure network, sensors communicate with other peer nodes and the cen-
tralized base station through wireless media. Each sensor data sample records the
location, time stamp and sensed values. Samples are reported to the base station
after data aggregation at local network access points.
The colligation of the mobile sensor network and wearable sensor devices is able
to provide health condition monitoring and telemedicine services for seniors and
chronic patients. A wearable mobile sensor device, Q sensor, has already been in-
vented to measures emotional arousal via skin conductance, as well as temperature
and activities of the sensor user [Q-s]. In addition, wearable sensors that measure
blood pressure, weight, and even hemoglobin are about to emerge. These sensors
are able to provide necessary data for online doctors to offer interactive telemedicine
service in real time. Data streams from these sensors are transmitted to the base
station by multi-hop communications to access points near houses or along road
sides. Whenever a node detects dramatic environmental changes around the user,
it creates the alert and reports to the base station. If it is necessary, doctors can
request more frequent measurements from the wearable sensor and send reminders
to the user for better preparation of the potential climate changes.
Mobile sensors installed on vehicles can be used for traffic monitoring and sur-
veying road conditions. Motion sensors could report the speed and bumpiness of
the vehicle, which reflect the traffic and road conditions, and the location and sens-
ing time of the motion sensors, to the traffic management center. Drivers are able
to know the traffic condition from both nearby vehicles and the traffic management
center in advance to make a better decision on route selection. Some car rental com-
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panies have also invested vehicle-embedded mobile sensors to monitor the speeding
violation of their clients and provide emergency assistance when unexpected car
breakdown happens on the trip.
In these scenarios, trajectory privacy is of critical concern, especially if human
beings or vehicles are carrying the sensors. Invasion by unauthorized entities into
the private trajectory of a user, such as when and where he/she shops, when and
which department in the hospital he/she visits, when and where he/she spends va-
cations and when and where he/she picks up his/her kids from school, may seriously
threaten personal safety. For example, a thief might wait for someone to return to
his/her home if he/she knows that person has just gone to the bank. Moreover, tra-
jectory information can reveal personal preferences and habits, which can be used
for consumer profiling. Insurance companies can utilize the trajectory information
to analyze frequent routes of clients. They might charge higher premiums from the
clients that often visit high accident locations. Car rental companies can help to
discourage dangerous driving and offer instant assistance by tracking their vehicles.
However, on the other side, clients are being “watched” all the time that they seem
to open their personal lives to other entities unawares.
1.2 Research Needs and Challenges
While some researchers have addressed problems related to trajectory privacy in
stationary wireless sensor networks, little work has been done to address problems
related to mWSNs. In much of the earlier research, the objective is to conceal the
location of static sensor nodes [KZTO05, XSS06, LR10, SYZC08, YSZ+08, PL12,
MLW12, PL11]. Another work [KXTZ07] attempts to conceal the time that a static
node observes a target, as opposed to concealing the location of the node. However,
the sensor nodes lack mobility in the above designs.
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Many researchers applied location obfuscation/generalization methods, such as
K-anonymity [Swe02], to generalize trajectory information to preserve users’ trajec-
tory privacy to cope with nodes’ mobility [CZBP06, MCA06, XC09, GKS07, DBS10,
GL08, YJHL08, GDVM09, HHJC12, ACG09]. However, this technique is vulner-
able to background knowledge attacks, query sampling attacks and query tracking
attacks [MGKV06, KGMP07, CM07]. Additionally, the often required anonymizer
unit/agent is an extra burden for resource-restricted sensor nodes. Xu et al. pro-
posed a distributed location generalization algorithm by allowing each node to com-
pute its location cloaking boxes, which satisfy the predefined network safety level
while on the move [XC09]. In this method, low node density results in a small
cloaking box to satisfy the network safety level, which leads to a trajectory privacy
leakage due to the high location resolution.
Another widely used trajectory privacy preservation method in mobile networks
is that mobile nodes collectively change their pseudonyms in regions called mix
zones [BS03, BS04, FRF+07, FSH09]. The method assumes the existence of a
trusted middleware system, positioned between the underlying location system(s)
and untrusted third-party applications. To fit in decentralized/distributed networks,
researchers proposed allowing each mobile node to dynamically obtain mix zones
[HMYS05, LSHP06]. Both of the aforementioned methods are appealing in resolv-
ing TPP issues in mWSNs. Nevertheless, when applying the techniques of location
obfuscation/generalization or pseudonyms in mix zones, the trust of the anonymizer,
the middleware system or cooperating nodes is prerequisite. How to evaluate such
trust-based cooperation in non-cooperative networks remains an open problem. Last
but not least, cryptographic and authentication mechanisms are susceptible to crit-
ical information leaks, such as the time of an event or a set of events, which an
adversary can use to infer the location of a targeted node, and therefore cannot be
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used as a stand-alone method to protect the privacy of mobile nodes’ trajectories.
Clearly, much work remains to be done.
1.3 Research Objectives
The more confidently a system hides the trajectory path of a wireless-mobile sensor
device, the wider the range of mWSN applications. Our research stems from the
recognition that applications of mWSNs will remain elusive unless a Trajectory
Privacy Preservation (TPP) mechanism is developed. The existing notions of TPP
must be modified due to the transition from stationary sensor networks to mWSNs
and in-network operations. This dissertation involves the design, development, and
simulation evaluation of an in-network TPP framework in mWSNs. Specifically, we
investigate the following three topics:
1. Prevent external trajectory privacy attacks
We begin with analyzing a low-cost external trajectory privacy attack and designing
the corresponding prevention technique. To analyze the trajectory of a mobile sen-
sor, existing solutions represent an object’s “trajectory” as an ordered list of location
samples at specific instances in time [GS05]. Although, such a list can adequately
represent the location changes of an object throughout its lifespan, it does not con-
tain the data necessary to analyze the suspicious trajectory pattern or relations
between peer nodes. For example, a static unauthorized node near access points
could be a malicious eavesdropper. A high correlation between the trajectories of
neighboring nodes could imply that one or multiple nodes are suspicious followers.
In resource-constraint sensor networks, where shortest-path routing protocol is com-
monly implemented, attackers can track down mobile nodes by eavesdropping into
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network communication through static eavesdroppers and followers. Therefore, our
first objective is to design a new routing protocol to prevent external attacks.
2. Detect internal security attacks
Besides external attacks, such as the eavesdropping attack we will explore in Chap-
ter 3, mWSNs are under the internal attack/node compromise attack as well. Node
compromise is a crucial security threat in sensor networks. Since sensor nodes have
inherent constraints such as limited energy, processing capability and memory space,
they are much more vulnerable than wired devices. Without hardware protection,
sensor nodes are easily tampered with and critical-system information can be easily
obtained. Under the threat of compromised nodes, nodes’ trajectory privacy are
hardly able to be protected since compromised nodes have authorization to access
the network and key information for decryption. In this scenario, node compromise
detection is a critical technique to guarantee network security and eliminate mali-
cious nodes. Hence, trajectory privacy will be improved. Our second objective is to
design a internal attack detection method.
3. Analyze nodes’ behaviors in TPP activities
Regardless of the attacking type, the restricted resource of sensor nodes determines
that relying on single sensor node to defend security and privacy attacks is an
impractical approach. On the other hand, seeking cooperation among trustworthy
entities could provide potential solutions by utilizing the high mobility and large
quantity of mobile nodes in mWSNs. Therefore, cooperative methods are preferred
in addressing security and privacy issues in our study. In this case, trust becomes
an inevitable issue in the methodology design, especially for autonomous nodes and
unattended mWSNs. Hence, there is an obvious need to model and analyze nodes’
behaviors in such environment to evaluate the trust among cooperation-involved
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nodes. Our last objective is to model selfish, malicious and cooperative nodes’
behaviors in TPP activities.
1.4 Research Approaches
To protect nodes’ trajectory privacy against external attacks, we develop a trajectory
privacy-aware routing protocol. We design the Basic Trajectory Privacy (BTPriv)
and Secondary Trajectory Privacy (STPriv) preservation algorithms. Both BTPriv
and STPriv employ the unique privacy-aware routing phase, where each node selects
the next-hop node according to the dynamic trajectory distance in order to hide its
trajectory. The privacy-aware routing phase requests each node to route its data
packets through the privacy-aware path instead of the shortest path. In order to
select the proper next-hop node which helps the target node to hide the location at
the time of data transmission from eavesdroppers, the target node needs to collect
limited trajectory information from its neighboring nodes. To avoid privacy inva-
sion of the neighbors trajectory privacy, we propose the one-time pad virtual name
for message exchanges. Using the trajectory privacy information of the neighbors,
the target node computes the dynamic trajectory distance to each neighbor. The
dynamic trajectory distance indicates the irrelevance between two trajectories at a
specific time. Finally, the target node selects the neighbor which has the highest
probability to mislead attackers as the next hop.
To detect the internal attack/node compromise attack, we design a software-
based attestation method. Software solutions for the security of WSNs eliminate
the need for excess hardware and are able to perform within the power constraints of
the sensor network. In the attestation, we use the base station as an external verifier
to challenge mobile nodes. A checksum is computed by the memory traversal func-
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tion from the memory content of the node being challenged. The memory traversal
function applies RC4 as the pseudorandom number generator. The selection of the
nodes performing the RC4 pseudorandom number generation is unpredictable. This
prevents certain nodes from being more susceptible to compromise. After the check-
sum attestation process, any deviations, according to an expected value, indicate
the detection of compromise.
To model and analyze nodes’ behaviors in TPP activities, we formulate in-
network TPP activities by applying the Bayesian game, named the TPP game,
to model selfish, malicious and cooperative behaviors of autonomous nodes in de-
centralized/distributed mWSNs. The selfishness is modeled by deploying trajectory
privacy sensitivity customization. We analyze the TPP game from both static and
dynamic points of view. The trust degree is evaluated by computing the dynamic be-
lief among cooperation-involved neighbors. Nodes update their belief based on their
observation on other nodes’ actions. Finally, we suggest the equilibrium strategy
for nodes to take actions in the TPP cooperation.
1.5 Research Contributions
Following the research objectives and approaches, we have developed an in-network
TPP framework that incorporates protocol design, algorithm development, mathe-
matical modelling and software simulations. To be specific, we make the following
contributions:
1. Design a context-based trajectory privacy-aware routing protocol to
prevent external attacks [JPC+12]
To prevent external attacks, we develop a distributed context-based trajectory
privacy-aware routing protocol by utilizing the trajectory dissimilarity.
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• We illustrate the possible external trajectory privacy attack in mWSNs. Since
most routing algorithms are shortest-path oriented, attackers can deduce that
the source node is within a certain subarea when they “hear” the correspond-
ing packets. Even though messages are encrypted, attackers could crack the
certain pattern of encryptions after a period of packets logging. Additionally,
some public background knowledge can be utilized to identify users. With
such information, attackers can now estimate the location of a specific mobile
node.
• We develop the one-time pad virtual name with the purpose of hiding trajec-
tories of the target node without requiring the third party. The one-time pad
virtual name is designed for exchanging necessary trajectory information used
in TPP cooperation. It provides the solution for data collecting among peer
nodes without breaching other nodes’ trajectory privacy.
• We create the privacy-aware routing phase utilizing the dissimilarity of trajec-
tories. The privacy-aware routing phase requests each node to route its data
packets through the privacy-aware path instead of the shortest path. The
next-hop node is selected based on the dynamic trajectory distance between
the current-hop node and the candidate, in order to mislead eavesdroppers
where the message starts its journey.
2. Design an unpredictable software-based attestation solution to detect
internal attacks [JPP+10]
To detect the node compromise attack, we design an unpredictable software-based
attestation solution, which allows the defender to utilize the advantage of on-the-fly
implementation.
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• We design an efficient software-based attestation mechanism with reduced en-
ergy consumption for battery-powered nodes. Compared to the previous re-
lated work, our attestation mechanism decreases checksum computation time
by almost 48% for selective attested nodes.
• We create dynamic attestation chains to achieve the unpredictability of node
verification to avoid creating areas of great susceptibility in the network. The
dynamic attestation chain utilizes the mobility of nodes and the highly dy-
namic network topology. The node-chain relationship is dynamic and inde-
pendent in different attestations. The role of each node may vary in each
attestation.
• We detect compromised nodes which are one hop away from the base station
in mWSNs where the nodes are moving around without fixed neighbors. The
proposed solution relaxes the assumption of fixed locations and neighborhoods
of nodes in attestations. It provides the flexibility to be applied in mobile
networks.
3. Model and analyze nodes’ behaviors using game theory [JPP+13]
To evaluate the trust degree among autonomous nodes, we apply Bayesian game
theory to model selfish, malicious and cooperative nodes’ behaviors in TPP activi-
ties.
• We apply the concept of trajectory privacy sensitivity customization to model
nodes’ selfishness. Generally speaking, users have different requirements for
TPP levels in different trajectory contexts. Taking control of the TPP level
enable users to better preserve their trajectory privacy to specifically meet
their needs. Meanwhile, it releases more available peer nodes to participate
into TPP cooperation.
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• We formulate the strategic TPP game among two nodes considering selfish,
malicious and cooperative behaviors of autonomous nodes. The game is viewed
as a strategic game, where one of the players has a private type at the begin-
ning of the game. We provide pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium [Mye97] of the game and suggest the trust degree in TPP
activities.
• We analyze the TPP game in the dynamic form and provide the belief system
for nodes to update the trust degree dynamically in the multi-stage TPP
game. We examine the dynamic TPP game in terms of Bayesian Condition
and derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium [FT91]. We simulate the TPP
game in a mWSN composed of 200 mobile nodes and analyze the network
trajectory privacy gain under different strategies of the nodes seeking TPP
cooperation.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
This research is one of the first attempts towards synthesizing of an integrated TPP
model for mWSNs that supports in-network operations and trajectory context-aware
services. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We survey the related
work in Chapter 2. The context-based trajectory privacy-aware routing protocol
is presented in Chapter 3. We focus on addressing the internal attack detection
in Chapter 4. Then we model and analyze nodes’ behaviors in TPP activities in
Chapter 5. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the current outcomes, identify
future research directions and conclude this dissertation in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Along with the fast development of mWSNs, the TPP solutions are in urgent need.
However, there are only a few studies have been done to address this issue. Many
existing studies focus on privacy preservation in WSNs with the premise that all the
network components are static. In other words, nodes lack mobility to be deployed
in mWSNs. Studies in Location Based Services (LBS) domain are not suitable for
mWSNs since sensors have much lower computational and communication capabil-
ities. Multi-hop transmission between nodes and the sinks is also a challenge for
adapting those solutions. TPP for Moving Objects Databases (MOD) publishing
and data mining provides some promising methods to hide trajectories. However,
mWSN applications require in-network TPP operations for real time data transmis-
sions and process. Without the informational support of off-line databases, these
methods cannot work well.
In this chapter, we provide a brief review of the literature in related domains,
including stationary WSNs (sWSNs), LBS applications, MODs and mWSNs. Be-
yond the scope of the study of this topic, we find an interesting extension of TPP
in GeoSocial Networks (GeoSNs). We provide a state-of-the-art review in this area
as well.
2.1 Trajectory Privacy Preservation (TPP) in sWSNs
Privacy preservation has so far been studied in stationary WSNs (sWSNs) in the ex-
isting literature under the assumption that both the sensor nodes and the sink/base
station are static. According to the taxonomy of privacy preservation techniques for
WSNs in [LZDT09], there are two main types of privacy concerns, data-oriented and
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context-oriented concerns. Context-oriented privacy, named as trajectory privacy in
this article, concerns the spatiotemporal information of an event. Particularly, TPP
aims to protect the location and time of an event monitored by static nodes, or the
location of the sink in sWSNs. In this article, the trajectory privacy of source nodes
is of interest. Source node represents the node that generates the message once it
observes active events in the network.
2.1.1 Location Privacy of the Source Node
The location of a source node is crucial in the case that attackers may catch or follow
the moving object that monitored by the sWSNs, such as protected animals, soldiers,
etc. The existing techniques fall into three categories: routing path randomization,
dummy traffic injection, and cryptographic technique. We review these techniques
as follows.
Routing Path Randomization
This main idea of this technique is to prevent attackers from tracking back the
message source location by adding random routing hops en route to the sink. Re-
searchers described the Panda-Hunter Game to study location privacy of the data
source node [KZTO05]. In order to hide the location of the Panda from adversaries
who try to capture the panda by back-tracing the routing path of the event mes-
sage, Phantom random walk routing is proposed. This routing protocol works in
the way that when the source sends an event message, the message is firstly unicas-
ted randomly or in a directed random fashion for certain hops before it is flooded
or routed to the sink. To improve the randomness of the routing paths, Greedy
Random Walk (GROW) is proposed. GROW requires the sensor node to randomly
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route the message to one of its neighbors, which has not participated in the previous
random walk [XSS06].
Li et al. studied a dynamic routing protocol which explicates the restricted ran-
dom selection of intermediate nodes for message forwarding [LR10]. The authors
suggest that in small scale WSNs, routing through single-intermediate nodes is effi-
cient. Such intermediate nodes are randomly selected by the source and need to be
away from the source with a minimum distance restriction. However, this method
is not suitable for large-scale networks since attackers may deduce that the source
is located within a circle region. The excessive long random routing paths cost
unnecessary network resources as well. Therefore, the authors suggest angle-based
and quadrant-based multi-intermediate nodes selection, where multiple intermediate
nodes are selected based on their relative angle and distance to the source according
to the sink. This method performs better in terms of message delivery ratio and
privacy preservation. However, since the source node needs to predetermine the se-
lected intermediate nodes and the quadrant reference frame, the computation could
become a high cost for the source.
Dummy Traffic Injection
Dummy traffic injection is another widely used technique to preserve source loca-
tion privacy in sWSNs. The main purpose is to perturb the network traffic to make
the real and fake events undistinguishable. Generally, this technique includes fake
message injection and fake source simulation.
Kamat et al. developed a simple scheme named Short-lived Fake Source Rout-
ing. It requires each node acting as a fake source by sending fake packets with a
predetermined probability [KZTO05]. This method is effective to prevent local ad-
versaries who can observe the traffic pattern in a small area. However, it is possible
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for global adversaries who have the information of the entire network transmission
rate and traffic patter to identify the fake packets.
To address this problem, Shao et al. proposed the statistic-based dummy mes-
sage injection [SYZC08]. In this method, all the nodes not only send fake messages
with intervals following a certain distribution, but also the real events. In this way,
the global adversary cannot distinguish the real events from fake messages. A similar
algorithm was proposed in [MLW12], where sensor nodes send packets periodically
and independently, including real or dummy packets.
The aforementioned dummy traffic injection may effectively hide the location
of the real source, however, transmitting excessive dummy messages in WSNs con-
sumes unnecessary energy and dramatically shorten the lifetime of sensor nodes.
Additionally, the heavy dummy traffic load may lead to high channel collision. To
address this issue, researchers proposed a Proxy-based Filtering Scheme (PFS) and
a Tree-based Filtering Scheme (TFS) in which some sensors are selected as proxies
to filter dummy messages before they reach the sink [YSZ+08].
Fake source simulation is another method of dummy traffic injection. Mehta
et.al applied source simulation in [MLW12]. This method generates simulated fake
objects to confuse the attacker by producing similar traffic patterns as the real
object.
Cryptographic Techniques
A straightforward technique is to use cryptographic techniques to encrypt users’
identities and data. Although symmetric and Public Key Cryptography (PKC) have
already been applied in resource-constrained environments, there are still concerns
in the implementations. For example, symmetric cryptography requires complex
protocols that suffer from other constraints. “Software realizations of PKC lead to
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relatively long duty cycles (operating intervals) which in turn require a significant
amount of energy. Computation is negligible if the PKC is performed by power
efficient hardware accelerators. In such cases the corresponding transmission power
becomes much more significant and dedicated hardware is required” [PLP08].
Furthermore, only relying on cryptographic methods cannot resolve trajectory
privacy issues in an effective and efficient way. Although the adversary does not
have the knowledge of encrypted sensor data, data packets headers are usually left
unencrypted for routing purposes where the source identity is revealed. In the case
when data packet headers are also encrypted, the adversary still can obtain some
public information of users, such as working and home addresses. Researchers have
already shown how the adversary can crack users’ encrypted/anonymized identities
[MGKV06, CM07] with adequate background knowledge. An effective cryptographic
method to prevent such encryption cracking to some extent is to encrypt or change
the header or node identities every hop en route of message transmissions [PL11].
However, such technique faces the issue of synchronizing the encryption between
nodes and the BS in implementations.
2.1.2 Temporal Privacy of the Source Node
Temporal information is the other element of trajectory information, besides location
information. As reviewed, location privacy in sWSNs has drawn much attention
from researchers. On the contrary, temporal privacy has not been formally defined.
Kamat et al. made temporal privacy the main focus for their work [KXTZ07].
As informally defined in [KXTZ07], “If we assume that the adversary stays at the
sink, collects all the packets that are generated by a source, and tries to infer the
creation times of these packets from the times when they are received, then the
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temporal privacy can be defined as the mutual information between the received
time sequences and the creation time sequences.” Given the hop count and average
delay on each hop, by observing the message’s arrival time, attackers are able to infer
the message’s generation time. It is possible to locate the event to a specific region,
given speed estimate. By monitoring multiple messages, the attacker may be able
to predict the next spot of the event. Kamat et al. developed the Rate-Controlled
Adaptive Delaying (RCAD) algorithm to protect temporal privacy. RCAD uses
intermediate nodes to buffer received packets. The processing delay distribution is
determined by the incoming traffic rate and available buffer space at each node.
RCAD employs buffer preemption mechanism to preemptively transmit the victim
packets under buffer saturation.It serves a good tradeoff between temporal privacy
and the buffer utilization. This method is very effective to prevent attackers from
inferring message’s generation time.
Despite the advances of the work noted in the previous two paragraphs, all of the
work, except [PL11], are limited in that they are restricted by the fixed locations
of the network components. That is, sensor nodes must have either predefined
neighborhood relations or fixed routing roles/positions in the network. In mWSNs,
both sensor nodes and the sink can be mobile entities; therefore, the aforementioned
methods cannot be applied. In the following paragraphs, we discuss methods that
consider users’ mobility.
2.2 TPP for LBS Applications
Trajectory privacy protection methods in LBS inherently consider users’ mobility
in that they are implemented on smart mobile devices. In some of these methods,
k-anonymity is applied, that is, a predetermined value of k is set, such that when a
user submits a query, either the query is aggregated with queries from k−1 users or
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the query includes k Point Of Interests (POIs). For example, in reference [Swe02],
researchers proposed a framework that requires a trusted third party or extra unit,
known as an anonymizer/cloaking agent. Upon receiving the query from a mobile
user, the anonymizer produces an “imprecise” service request and forwards it to the
server. The imprecise result is produced by removing the user’s ID and aggregating
the query with k − 1 queries from other users in a certain cloaking region. After
the server responds to the queries, the anonymizer translates/filters the response
and sends the “precise” results back to the user. Building on this framework, the
following methods were implemented: In reference [MCA06], researchers employed
a grid-based complete pyramid data structure that hierarchically decomposes the
space into H levels to create cloaking regions. In reference [GKS07, DBS10], re-
searchers generated cloaking regions by implementing a Hilbert space filling curve.
In reference [YJHL08], researchers generated cloaking regions by computing the
exact k Nearest Neighbors (kNN)in an incremental fashion. In reference [GL08], re-
searchers proposed a personalized k-anonymity model that allows each mobile user
to define and modify the anonymity level in both temporal and spatial dimensions.
Last but not least, in reference [GKK+08], researchers proposed a method that does
not use an anonymizer, but requires an off-line phase that maps POIs’ locations on
the service regions into indexes. In this method, users encrypt the query with redun-
dant information, and filter the redundancy in the response. A similar idea proposed
in reference [KYS05] is to simply generate dummy queries to confuse attackers.
Regardless the efficiency, effectiveness and the practicalness of the above solu-
tions, k-anonymity is vulnerable to background obtained attack, query sampling
attack and query tracking attack. To prevent background knowledge attacks, re-
searchers proposed the l-diversity principle, which requires that the sensitive at-
tribute needs to contain at least l well-represented values [MGKV06]. To prevent
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query sampling attacks, researchers proposed the Reciprocity concept, which means
a cloaking region not only contains at least k users, but the region is also shared
by at least k of these users [KGMP07, CM07]. Finally, to prevent query tracking
attacks, researches proposed to apply a memorization property for cloaked queries
[CM07].
2.3 TPP in the Off-line Manner
In the LBS domain, trajectory privacy is considered as location sample privacy
in most existing literature. A sequence of anonymized location samples’ can be
easily utilized by attackers to infer the trajectory. Very often, a third party, named
anonymizer, is necessary for message translation, which is a heavy burden for sensor
networks. To anonymize the trajectory, rather than only location samples, known
as trajectory anonymization [Ghi09], other researchers studied this issue in off-line
applications, such as MOD publishing and mining. One of the early work proposed
to select a trusted location broker and set up privacy policy (e.g. the sensitivity and
update frequency [GX04]). When the user’s location is updated, the broker checks
the update and compares it with the policy to check for violation. If any is found,
it simply suppresses the update. Another researcher proposed to use the ID proxy
to strip off the user’s ID and forward the anonymous updates [HGXA07]. The ID
proxy also cloaks k updates to achieve k-anonymity. The same author developed a
path confusion approach in [HG05]. The main idea is to cut the trajectories into
short segments and select some segments to apply the path confusion algorithm to
mislead attackers. A more common approach for hiding trajectories is trajectory
generalization. Briefly speaking, the trajectory needs to be transformed or distorted
to some extent and grouped with other k − 1 trajectories into a cluster [NAS08].
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Hilbert curve [YBLW09] and Greedy Algorithm [MAA+10, ABN08] were employed
to find the k − 1 nearest neighbors to form a cluster. Although trajectory privacy
in database domain considers both users’ mobility and spatiotemporal relations
among samples, the premise is the availability of the whole trajectory information.
Hence, existing solutions can only be applied to off-line data. Concentration in the
development of in-network, online context-aware solutions has been neglected.
2.4 TPP in MWSNs
There are only a few works that studied trajectory privacy issues, specifically fo-
cusing on mWSNs. One proposed technique to preserve mobile nodes’ trajectory
privacy is to reduce the location resolution to meet the privacy requirement [XC09].
The authors consider an ad hoc network composed of sensor nodes deployed in a
hostile environment. They developed a location cloaking technique which allows
nodes to provide location information for services, yet prevents malicious locating.
To be more specific, each node will recursively compute a cloaking box by broad-
casting its current locating region partition P and counting the number of neighbors
within P. P is divided into equal halves until the number of nodes within P meets the
desired safety level, where P is set to be the cloaking box. This cloaking box is used
as location information for reporting to service providers. To compute the cloaking
box in the presence of node mobility, LEAVE, JOIN and MERGE messages need
to be created to update the cloaking boxes for all the nodes in the corresponding
partitions upon nodes’ movements.
Another TPP method in mobile networks is that mobile nodes collectively change
their pseudonyms in pre-defined regions called mix zones [BS03, BS04, FRF+07,
FSH09]. The mechanism works in the way that if multiple mobile nodes change
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their pseudonyms in the mix zone, the adversary cannot link new pseudonyms to
the previous ones. Hence, the attacker cannot track a particular node. This method
assumes the existence of a trusted middleware system, positioned between the un-
derlying location system(s) and untrusted third-party applications. To fit in de-
centralized/distributed networks, researchers proposed to allow each mobile node
to dynamically obtain mix zones [HMYS05, LSHP06]. The use of mix zones is
appealing in resolving TPP issues in mWSNs. Nevertheless, the trust of the middle-
ware system or cooperating nodes is prerequisite. How to evaluate such trust-based
cooperation in non-cooperative networks remains an open problem.
2.5 TPP in GeoSNs
With the incredibly fast spreading of online social networks and the evolution of
real-time geocoding and geotagging technology, GeoSN applications are becoming
increasingly popular. As formally defined in Gambs et al.’s work, a GeoSN is “a web-
based or mobile-based service that allow users to (1) construct a profile containing
some of their geolocated data (along with additional information), (2) connect with
other users of the system to share their geolocated data and (3) interact with the
content provided by other users” [GHP11]. Popular GeoSNs, such as Foursquare,
Twitter, Facebook Places, provide convenient interfaces for users to share their tra-
jectory data with families, friends, and even the public. However, the trajectory
privacy leakage during such sharing experience may lead to severe safety threats
[Rob].
In this section, we focus on trajectory privacy concerns in the field of GeoSNs
and highlight related literature. We first briefly introduce the findings in analysing
privacy risk of the representative GeoSN applications. Then, we review the TPP
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mechanisms proposed in the existing literature. Finally, we summarize TPP chal-
lenges and open issues in GeoSNs in Chapter 6.
2.5.1 Trajectory Privacy Risk Analysis in GeoSNs
Most of GeoSN providers did not pay much attention on trajectory privacy issues in
the first place. Gambs et al. provide a comparative privacy risk analysis of several
existing GeoSNs, including Foursquare, Qype, La Ruche and Twitter [GHP11]. The
authors compare these GeoSNs in terms of privacy issues in the criteria of registra-
tion information, real identities versus pseudonyms, information available to others
and privacy settings. They conclude that most current GeoSNs do not directly in-
tegrated many privacy features.
Trajectory privacy risk in GeoSNs could be caused by three different resources,
including 1) social network profiles, 2) location check-ins and queries, and 3) event
posts and multimedia tagging.
Pontes et al. analyze the datasets collected from Foursquare, Google+ and Twit-
ter. Without location inferring mechanisms, they found that the vast majority of
Foursquare users provided valid home city locations in the corresponding venue
attributes [PMV+12]. Similar findings are presented in [PVA+12], where a large
number of users are found to exposure full addresses in their residential venue pro-
files. By analyzing the frequency and statistics of check-ins and geolocated data
posts, these two groups of researchers also provide the location inferring mecha-
nisms to infer possible residential addresses of GeoSN users. The results indicate
that 78% of the analyzed users’ home cities can be easily and correctly inferred
within 50 kilometers of distance. Jin et al. focused on modeling and comparing
the access control mechanisms for users’ check-ins in the popular GeoSNs [JLJ12].
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They conclude that there is no fine-grained access control mechanism for users’
check-in information components. Co-location tagging also creates vulnerabilities
to trajectory privacy. In [CCL13], Cheng et al. proposed a probabilistic framework
overcoming the absence of granular location information in the posts to estimate a
microblog (such as Twitter) user’s location purely relying on her publicly available
posts. Besides utilizing the geolocated data posts, the authors also developed a
classifier to identify words in status updates with a local geographic scope to dis-
cover the association of certain words or phrases with certain locations. As a result,
this framework provides k estimated cities for each user with a descending order
of possibility. On average, 51% of randomly selected microblog users are located
within 100 miles of their actual locations. These aforementioned findings indicate
that trajectory privacy leakage and risk associated with GeoSN applications cannot
be ignored and they are the critical issues which hinder the development of GeoSNs.
2.5.2 TPP Techniques in GeoSNs
Trajectory Obfuscation
The TPP issue in GeoSNs is more complex compared with in other LBS applications
(we will analyze the challenges in Chapter 6). There are only a few works that have
been proposed to address this issue. One of the major approaches is to apply the
trajectory obfuscation technique, such as spatiotemporal cloaking and space trans-
formation.
Cuellar et al. first formally defined a number of notions for evaluating a location
obfuscation function [COR12]. The authors formalize the concept of indistinguisha-
bility of obfuscation functions, which requires that the user’s actual location should
be indistinguishable from a set a possible positions, e.g. an obfuscation region which
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includes the real location and noise. Indistinguishability needs to be satisfied under
different scenarios: 1) when the attacker queries a user’s position at regular inter-
vals, the attacker should not be able to increase the precision of his knowledge on
the real location up to the predefined threshold chosen by the user; 2) an adversary
should not be able to determine the destination from the user’s original position
and location updates in route; 3) an adversary cannot deduce that the user revisits
a certain location. Additionally, with such indistinguishable properties, the obfus-
cation region needs to be constant for all points contained within it. For more strict
trajectory privacy protection, the obfuscation function needs to prevent attackers
from determining users’ current and past routes as well. Although this work defined
an explicit concept of indistinguishability, it did not consider the impact of social
relationships and interactions among users on the privacy leakage, which is highly
possible to be utilized by the adversary to infer users’ locations.
On the contrary, Freni et al. attempted to deploy a centralized trusted entity to
process a user’s original resource, which may involve multiple users before publishing
it to the GeoSN to insure it complies involved users’ privacy preferences [FRVM+10].
The authors introduce the notion of Minimal Uncertainty Region (MUR) as a spa-
tiotemporal region for which an adversary cannot infer any internal point as the
users’ actual location. The location cloaking system architecture is presented in
Figure 2.1. The pre-processing module is designed to retrieve the privacy prefer-
ences of all the involved users and the corresponding MUR. The cloaking module
applies spatial generalization and/or temporal generalization (depending on the ser-
vice attribute whether it is time sensitive) algorithms to generalize the pre-processed
srg if the disclosure of srg introduces privacy violations. Then, the result is pro-
cessed by the publisher module, where the users’ absence privacy preferences will
be complied by postponing the publication of the resources, if necessary. This step
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Figure 2.1: System architecture in [FRVM+10]
is to enforce users’ trajectory privacy under the scenario that an attacker may infer
a user’s absence by utilizing the current MUR and maximum velocity. This system
has great potential to be adapted on top of the current GeoSN architectures. How-
ever, the centralized trusted clocking entity could be an issue to be designated.
Puttaswamy et al. applied a user-specific, distance-preserving space transfor-
mation algorithm, named LocX, under the assumption that the GeoSN servers or
other intermediaries are untrusted. This algorithm is intended to deal with point
queries and nearest-neighbor queries [PWS+12]. The main idea is that users share
secret keys with their friends and use these keys to encrypt location data and store
them in the proxy to process location queries. The encryption mapping is split
into two pairs: a mapping from the transformed location to an encrypted index,
named L2I, and a mapping from the index to the encrypted location data, named
I2D. These two pairs are stored in two modules/servers in the proxy. When a user
submits a query referencing to a certain POI, she submits the query in the form of
transformed location data encrypted by symmetric keys to the proxy. The proxy
returns all the pairs of L2I that are in the user’s query. Then, the user decrypts
the index and queries the I2D pair. The proxy then returns the encrypted location
data pair with the corresponding index. Although the authors claimed that LocX
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can run on mobile devices with low computation and communication cost, how the
computation power consumption is evaluated is not presented that , which is an
important concern of mobile users. Moreover, the symmetric key distribution and
rekeying management could be difficult to develop in practical GeoSNs.
There is another k-anonymity-based location cloaking algorithm proposed by
Masoumzadeh et al., focusing on anonymizing GeoSN Datasets [MJ11]. In this
work, the authors tackle the issue that the location information revealed by social
connections may assist an attacker in re-identifying a user. In order to guaran-
tee the privacy of users’ locations and identifies, the GeoSN datasets should satisfy
L2k-anonymity, meaning that there are at least k−1 other users assigned the same lo-
cation information for each user, and each user’s adjacent users in the social network
are also assigned the same location information as the k − 1 other users’ adjacent
users. The algorithm starts with each user as a separate cluster, centering at her
location. In each iteration, the distance between every pair of clusters is computed
in order to select the minimum pair to form a new cluster. The iteration stops until
the cloaking region satisfies L2k-anonymity. The possible difficulty to implement this
algorithm is that, in some cases, the uniqueness of a user may result in impossibil-
ity to satisfy L2k-anonymity, such as a user is travelling out of town. Additionally,
this work focuses on the data sets anonymization. There are still issues to adopt
this algorithm into in-network computing, such as how to retrieve the location of
other users to compute the distance. Nevertheless, the concept of L2k-anonymity has
great potential to resolve TPP in GeoSNs, where the social relationship is playing
an important role.
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Context Analysis
In GeoSN applications, context analysis is particularly an important tool for security
and privacy protection due to the rich semantic contents during social interactions.
Riboni et al. proposed an initial investigation to prevent users’ POI preferences
from being learned by other users, which leads to privacy leakage [RB12]. The
main idea is to apply PINQ [McS09] query engine to enforce ǫ-differential privacy
by adding random noise to extract statistics about personal preferences for POIs.
To protect trajectory privacy, users submit their queries with a spatial granule in
which they are currently located instead of the accurate location. Unfortunately, as
an initial investigation, there are no details of how to define the granularity level of
the granule to guarantee both trajectory privacy and service accuracy.
Jagtap et al. proposed a context-aware access control mechanism [JJFZ11].
They adopt Web Ontology Language to capture users’ characteristics, including
location and surroundings, the presence of other people and devices, feeds from
social networking systems they use and the inferred activities in which they are
engaged. The reasoning engine is used to handle queries and performs reasoning for
access control decisions. These two components support the privacy control module
to enforce access control of the query to protected information. The privacy control
module is embedded at both client and server sides to check the privilege to access
protected resources for peer-to-peer queries and peer-to-server queries. There are
several concerns to apply this mechanism: 1) the server might not be trustworthy;
2) the energy consumption of the client is not neglectful; and 3) since the privacy
control module collects all the user’s social profiles and preferences, it may need
extra protection for security reasons.
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Identity and Location Encryption
Cryptography technique is a fundamental and direct solution for security and pri-
vacy protection. In GeoSNs, symmetric key encryption and hashing methods are
commonly used in TPP in proximity services. Since proximity service is a particular
application which mainly involves location coordinates manipulation and distance
computation, the existing methods lack generality to be applied in other GeoSN
applications. Hence, we limit the number of related literature here. More explicit
materials are surveyed in [MFB+10, AEM+07].
Mascetti et al. proposed two protocols, named C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash,
to protect a user’s location privacy from untrusted Service Providers (SPs) and other
users when she submits a proximity service request. In the C-Hide&Seek protocol,
the SP replies with a message containing the latest encrypted location updates of
each friend of the requester. Since the encryption uses symmetric key, the requester
can decrypt the message using the keys that shared with her friends. To prevent at-
tackers from inferring that the target is crossing the boundary between two granules
by monitoring the time stamp of the location updates, the location is only updated
after a certain interval and identified by an interval index. The major difference of
C-Hide&Hash with respect to C-Hide&Seek is that the requester provides a set of
granules to check if any of her friend’s location falls in this set. In this case, other
users’ locating granules are protected from the requester. This work has considered
untrusted SPs and curious users, and provided the complete privacy preservation
protocols in proximity service. The guaranteed location privacy has been theoreti-
cally approved. However, how to properly define the update interval still remains a
question. Additionally, these protocol might not be applicable in time sensitive ser-
vices due to the improper update interval. Moreover, as most other methods using
symmetric keys, the key distribution issue needs to be addressed before practical im-
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plementations. Li et al. also applied symmetric key hashing to transform location
information during proximity service querying under similar system assumptions
[LHX12]. Their work is focusing on increasing the proximity detection accuracy by
using optimal grid overlay and multi-level grids.
In [PMM], Provost et al. suggest to used one-to-one or many-to-one hashing
to hash users’ identities and location information. This work focuses on utilizing
GeoSN behavior similarity for advertisement targeting like-minded individuals. Car-
bunar et al. designed the mechanisms that construct users’ location centric profiles
in a private and correct manner [CRRB12]. In this work, the authors bring atten-
tion to the issue of dishonesty in GeoSN applications, such as Yelp, Foursquare,
where users may create incorrect check-ins to gain benefits, as well as the privacy
violation issue when venues collect users’ location centric profiles. The main idea is
to install a device at each venue to initiate a challenge and authorize a timestamped
token encrypted by its secret key to check-in users. This step is used to prove a
user’s physical presence at the venue. Then, the venue collects the user’s profile
by increasing the counter by 1 on a certain dimension and the corresponding range
where user’s profile value falls in. Furthermore, the statistics of the collected profiles
is published. Although these two studies lack details of TPP mechanisms, they are
inspiring studies that consider the TPP issue in the inherent design of GeoSNs.
In Chapter 6, we will conclude the characteristics of trajectory privacy and dis-
cuss the challenges in GeoSNs.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed the existing main techniques to protect trajectory
privacy in the domains of WSNs, LBS applications, MODs, and GeoSNs. The
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previous work is of high inspiration and have greatly enlightened our work. In the
following chapters, we will present our results so far and provide promising future
extensions of this topic.
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CHAPTER 3
TRAJECTORY PRIVACY-AWARE ROUTING PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we intend to resolve the TPP issue under the common external
attack, i.e. eavesdropping attack. The aim of this work is to develop a mechanism
which hides the trajectory of the data source node, denoted as the target node, on
the fly with considering nodes’ mobility in WSNs. In this chapter, “on the fly”
is defined as a node hiding its trajectory while undergoing data transmissions. In
other words, it is a distributed method that protects trajectory privacy prior to data
reaching the centralized database/base station.
3.1 System Model
The considered network is the mobile sensor network with stationary backbone
infrastructures for realistic applications.
• Base Station (BS): The BS is the sink receiving data from APs. It is the center
for data analysis and management.
• Access Points (APs): Multiple APs are interconnected through a backbone
network and connected to the BS. The network area is partitioned into N
distinct subareas SUB = {Sub1, Sub2, ..., SubN}. The AP is located at the
center of a subarea Subi and serves near nodes within the entire subarea,
named correspondingly APi. Nodes report sensed data through one or multiple
hops to reach one of the APs. Then APs forwards the data to the BS. We
assume the physical location distance is equivalent to routing path distance
during data transmissions between nodes and APs.
• Mobile nodes: Mobile nodes are homogenous sensors with diverse trajectory
patterns and moving velocities. Nodes send data to the nearby APs; include
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both sensing data and trajectory information for system localization purposes.
The mobility is provides by carriers, named users, such as human bodies,
cellular phones, and endangered species. We consider U = {u1, u2, ..., uk} a
set of K nodes moving within SUB during a time period T = {t1, t2, ..., tT}.
The accurate trajectory of node u is Tru, defined in the next section. The
real trajectory set of all K nodes is R = {Tr1, Tr2, ..., Trk}. The approximate
trajectory set of node u is ru = {Subut1 , Subut2, ..., SubutT } during T .
3.2 Adversarial Model
We developed this project with considering the passive attack. Inspired by the
framework in [STLBH11], we characterize the adversary by his knowledge and at-
tack.
• Knowledge: The adversary has adequate computation capability, energy and
memory for data storage. The adversary does not have the knowledge of
encrypted sensor data. However, data packets headers are usually left unen-
crypted for routing purposes where the source identity is revealed. Moreover,
the adversary could easily obtain some public information of users, such as
working and home addresses. Therefore, the adversary could even crack en-
crypted identities. The adversary is also assumed to know some system pa-
rameters, include the network partition SUB and the user set U . We define
the whole knowledge of the adversary AK.
• Attack: The adversary behaves in honest-but-curious model [Gol04]. He
deploys multiple stationary nodes to eavesdrop wireless communications in
the network. The preferred locations of these eavesdroppers are near APs,
where sensor data streams are aggregated. Since most routing algorithms
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are shortest-path oriented, the adversary can deduce that the source node is
near a certain AP or within a certain subarea when he “hears” the corre-
sponding packets. The adversary monitors traffics over the entire network. In
other words, this is a global adversary. The adversary does not launch active
attacks to interfere with proper functions of the network. Moreover, node
compromise attack is excluded. The objective of the adversary is to find out
the whole trajectory of nodes’ tracking attack; or to localize a node at a given
time instant-localization attack. This node is the target node. We consider
data source nodes as target nodes in this project. The trajectory set of all
K users observed by the adversary is R′ = {T ′r1, T
′
r2, ..., T
′
rk}. The approxi-
mate trajectory set of node u in time period T observed by the adversary is
r′u = {Sub
′
ut′
1
, Sub′ut′
2
, ..., Sub′ut′
T
}. All observations of the adversary is denoted
as O.
The eavesdropping attack is a simple and effective trajectory privacy attack. Pri-
vacy attackers behave in honest-but-curious model [Gol04]. They deploy multiple
stationary sensor nodes called eavesdroppers around each AP. Since most routing
algorithms are shortest-path oriented, attackers can deduce that the source node is
near a certain AP or within a certain subarea when they “hear” the corresponding
packets. Even though messages are encrypted in some highly-secured sensor net-
works, packets headers are usually left unencrypted for routing purposes where the
source identification is revealed. Moreover, even if headers are encrypted, attackers
could crack the certain pattern of header encryption of each node after a period of
packets logging. With the revealed header information, attackers can now estimate
the location of a specific mobile node by eavesdropping near APs. After a time span,
the eavesdropped records near all APs could provide attackers the fundamentals to
analyze the trajectory pattern of the user.
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Figure 3.1: Trajectory privacy attack - eavesdropping attack illustration
Figure 3.1 is an illustration of trajectory privacy attack by eavesdropping. The
user carries a wearable sensor moving in the resident area. The attacker have de-
ployed several eavesdroppers, which are shown as red dots, at APs. The black curve
represents the real trajectory of the user, while the red straight line represents the
obtained trajectory by the attacker. The attacker may even perceive that the user
visited the hospital and the school, and passed by the park and the bank without a
stop, by comparing the amount of packets heard at different APs. Without access-
ing the centralized database and message content, they still can obtain the private
trajectory information, as shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Trajectory obtained by eavesdroppers
T ru r
′
u
t1 HOME HOME
t2− t3 HOSPITAL HOSPITAL
t4 TRAVEL PARK
t5− t6 SCHOOL SCHOOL
t7 TRAVEL BANK
t8 HOME HOME
3.3 Objectives and Evaluations
With the knowledge AK and observation O, the adversary is trying to reconstruct
R and r correctly. If the adversary is able to localize users to specific subareas in
time period T , he will also successfully track users. Therefore, our objective is to
prevent the adversary from reconstructing r for each user. The evaluations metrics
are developed based on adversarial evaluation metrics proposed in [STLBH11]. We
define our evaluation metrics in the following.
Let x′ut, u ∈ U and t ∈ T , be the estimate of the subarea that node u was located
in at time t. For all target nodes during T , all estimates based on the observation
O comply with the probability distribution P (X = x′ut|O), x
′
ut ∈ SUB. The real
subarea that u was located in is denoted as xut ∈ SUB. The incorrectness E, which
is the adversary’s expected estimation error, can be quantified using the expected
distance between xut and x
′
ut with probability distribution P (X|O). For example,
this distance can be the distance between APut and AP
′
ut. Assuming the coordinates
of these APs in 2D space are (aut, but) and (a
′
ut, b
′
ut), respectively, the incorrectness
can be computed as follows:
E =
∑
x′ut
P (X = x′ut|O)
√
(aut − a′ut)2 + (but − b
′
ut)2. (3.1)
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The incorrectness E of the adversary is the metric that evaluates the trajectory pri-
vacy of the system. The higher E is, the higher the trajectory privacy is.
Recall that the adversary in our model is a global adversary. Therefore, it is pos-
sible that he could estimate possible trajectories by analyzing the traffic distribution
in the entire network. For an instance, if packets from target nodes are “heard” by
certain eavesdroppers with obvious higher probability, the adversary will be able
to learn that the real trajectories have special connections with the these subareas.
The estimated trajectories could be constrained by the special connections. We use
entropy of the distribution P (X = x′ut|O), x
′
ut ∈ SUB to evaluate the performance
of our algorithms against the global adversary. The entropy is computed by:
H = −
∑
x′ut
P (X = x′ut|O) logP (X = x
′
ut|O). (3.2)
The higher the entropy is, the more uniform the distribution is. It gives the lower
probability to the adversary to find out the special connections.
3.4 Proposed Method
In this section, we first present a definition of trajectory, which is often used in MOD
literature [GS05]. For simplicity, we assume that nodes are moving in 2D space. We
have the following:
Definition 3.4.1 A trajectory Tr of a moving node is a polyline in the three dimen-
sional space, where two dimensions refer to space and the third dimension to time.
It is represented as a sequence of points < (x1, y1, t1), (xi, yi, ti), (xn, yn, tn) > with
t1 < ti < tn.
Each point (xi, yi, ti) in the sequence represents the 2D location (xi, yi) of the node,
at time ti. Observe that the trajectory above is defined in MOD, where all infor-
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mation is collected into the oﬄine database for trajectory analysis. Moreover, the
difference in initial points between two trajectories is often ignored during analysis,
such as trajectory pattern mining, trajectory similarity computing, etc. In order to
hide the node’s trajectory on the fly in mWSNs, we need to analyze the dynamic
trajectory distance between two nodes on the network.
The dynamic trajectory distance represents the irrelevance of two trajectories in
terms of 2D location and velocity at a specific time. At time t, given the 2D location
(xit,yit) and velocity vector,
−→
it , of node i , and the 2D location (xjt, yjt) and velocity
vector,
−→
jt of node j, the location distance between i and j
Dl(i, j, t) =
√
(xit − xjt)2 + (yit − yjt)2
rmax
, (3.3)
where rmax is the maximum transmission distance of a node in the network. The
velocity direction distance is derived from the cosine similarity of two vectors, which
is
Dv(i, j, t) = 1− Sim(
−→
it ,
−→
jt ) = 1− cosλ = 1−
−→
it ·
−→
jt
||
−→
it || · ||
−→
jt ||
, (3.4)
where λ is the relative angle between
−→
it and
−→
jt . The unified speed of node j
S(j, t) =
||
−→
jt ||
Smax
, (3.5)
where Smax is the possible maximum speed of sensor nodes. Finally, we have the
following:
Definition 3.4.2 The Dynamic Trajectory Distance (DTD) represents the irrele-
vance of two trajectories in terms of 2D location and velocity at a specific time.
Given Dl(i, j, t) and Dv(i, j, t) between the target node i and its neighbor node j,
and S(j, t) of the neighbor j, the dynamic trajectory distance
DT = w1Dl(i, j, t) + w2Dv(i, j, t) + w3S(j, t), (3.6)
where W (w1, w2, w3) is a predefined weighted vector and w1 + w2 + w3 = 1.
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3.4.1 Basic Trajectory Privacy Preservation
From Figure 3.1, we observe the following: 1. without breaking the network security,
privacy attackers could estimate the target node’s trajectory by simply eavesdrop-
ping messages en route at low cost; 2. attackers could obtain trajectory infor-
mation during message transmissions in-network without accessing the centralized
database/base station; 3. conventional shortest-path oriented routing protocols (for
simplicity, we will use conventional routing protocols) create the possibility for at-
tackers to deduce trajectory information.
Based on the above observation, we propose to use Trajectory Privacy-aware
routing (TPriv) to hide the target node’s trajectory on the fly. With TPriv im-
plementation, the target node takes the advantages of nodes mobility and routes
messages to non-local APs in order to mislead attackers. They are not able to de-
duce the real trajectory through passive attack on the network.
TPriv has two different phases for message routing: conventional routing phase
and privacy-aware routing phase. For the message requesting high priority in trans-
mission delay, such as emergency sent by patients to ask instant help from doctors,
the conventional routing phase is only needed for the data transmission. For regular
data, which is collected by the base station periodically from nodes, the privacy-
aware routing phase is requested, followed by the conventional routing phase.
In the conventional routing phase, packets are routed according to the shortest-
path routing algorithm. In sensor networks, this algorithm can be pro-active, reac-
tive, geographical, power-aware, hybrid routing algorithm, etc. Due to the high dy-
namic network topology, on-demand oriented routing algorithms are recommended.
However, details of the algorithms are out of the scope of this work. We contribute
to propose the privacy-aware routing phase to address TPP issues specifically. The
objective of this phase is intuitive and effective: Through forwarding the message to
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non-local APs, it prevents the trajectory privacy eavesdropping attack at network
APs. To achieve this objective, the target node needs to select the next hop under
the principle that among all the neighboring nodes the candidate has the highest
probability to forward the packet to a non-local AP.
To meet this principle, two difficulties need to be overcome as an on-line dis-
tributed design: The target node does not have the trajectory information of its
neighboring nodes as the background knowledge to select the next hop; assuming
the first problem is overcome, the trajectory privacy of neighboring nodes can be
breached by the target node.
TPriv overcomes both these difficulties and meets the design principle. The
target node first collects limited information from its neighbors before data trans-
mission in query-and-reply fashion. Then each neighbor is evaluated in terms of its
dynamic trajectory distance to the target node. Finally, sensed data is routed to
a non-local AP through the selected next hop. Note that, in order to prevent the
target node to breach other nodes’ trajectory privacy, one-time pad Virtual Identi-
fication (VID) is employed during trajectory query and reply. In the following, we
will explain how the privacy-aware routing phase works in the basic TPriv in detail.
Dynamic Trajectory Information Collection
During this stage, two types of VID will be used: Query VID (QVID) for query
messages and Reply VID (RVID) for reply messages. Both are one-time pads that
generated by the node itself. Each VID is valid for a certain period of time. The life
time for QVID LTQ = ∆T , while LTR = 2∆T for RVID, where ∆T is the message
transmission interval. LTQ is designed to prevent the target node from sending con-
tinuous queries during one message transmission interval which may lead to a waste
in bandwidth or even network congestion. LTR is designed to prevent the target
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Figure 3.2: Query-and-reply under VID
node from selecting one neighboring node as the next hop continuously. The VID is
not used for data transmissions. There is no need to set up the third party [CZBP06]
for virtual name translation/mapping between nodes and the base station, which
gives extra burden to the network.
Before the target node transmits data, it broadcasts a dummy query message
under its QVID. Each one-hop neighbor replies this dummy query under its RVID.
The reply contains the dynamic trajectory information of each neighbor, including
current location and velocity. During time ∆T , any duplicate query message with
the same QVID will be ignored by neighbors. After the target node receives the
reply, it temporarily stores the dynamic trajectory information with the correspond-
ing RVID except the entry which has the same RVID as the selected next hop during
the last data transmission. This is for preventing the curious neighboring node from
acting as a beacon node to track the target node [YBLW09]. The query-and-reply
operation is shown in Figure 3.2. The shadow area indicates the radio coverage area
of the target node.
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DTD Computation and the Next-hop Node Selection
At this stage, the target node selects a next-hop node for data transmissions. Next-
hop nodes could be more than one, which may provide better performance in terms
of privacy. However, there is a tradeoff between privacy and power consumption. So
far, we have considered one next-hop node only. The target node computes the DT
to each neighbor according to Equation 3.6, respectively. Since DT represents the
irrelevance of two trajectories in terms of the 2D location and velocity at a specific
time, the neighbor, which has the greatest DT to the target, is selected as the next
hop at the time of data transmissions. Assuming DT computation time is negligible,
the candidate remains staying at the same location and with the same velocity.
After the selected next-hop node receives the message, it resets the hop count en-
try in the packet header to be 0 and starts the conventional routing phase. With the
implementation of TPriv, the target node routes each regular message to a non-local
AP with a certain probability. It misleads the passive privacy attacker at each time
of data transmission. However, the probability of reaching non-local APs with one-
hop privacy-aware routing phase is undesirable in large-scale networks. Moreover,
the frequency of each non-local AP to be on the route may disclose the trajectory of
the target node to global attackers after a sequence of time. Therefore, we propose
the improved TPriv, named as Secondary TPriv, to resolve these problems. The
above method is named as Basic TPriv (BTPriv).
3.4.2 Secondary TPriv(STPriv)
STPriv improves the basic TPriv in two aspects to resolve the aforementioned prob-
lems of BTPriv: extend one-hop to M-hop privacy-aware routing phase and ran-
domize the probability of routing in privacy-aware routing fashion.
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M-hop Privacy-aware Routing Phase
In large-scale networks, the probability that packets are routed to different subareas
is decreased. Basic TPriv only provides a very limited range for finding non-local
APs. Therefore, we invent the m-hop privacy-aware routing phase, which means the
following m next-hops will be selected in a privacy-aware fashion. M is a predefined
parameter, depending on the network deployment. Here we take m equal to 2 as
an example. The following next-hop selection process is the same. Upon receiving
packets from the target node, the intermediate node takes similar procedures as the
target node in selecting the second next-hop node, except for message filtering and
the DTD computation.
To avoid a routing loop, in the case that any intermediate node routes the
message back or closer to the previous-hop node, the intermediate node broadcasts
the query message with the same QVID as the previous-hop node. Any neighbor who
receives the duplicate query message consecutively ignores this query. Therefore, the
next-hop selection is constrained to the neighbors, which are at least two hops away
from the target node at the start of this data transmission.
For the DTD computation,in order to forward packets in further distance, the
second-hop candidate with greater Dl, higher speed and smaller Dv, is preferred.
This is because the current intermediate node already has very different velocity
direction from the target node after the basic privacy-aware routing phase. The
DTD is computed as follows:
D′T = w1Dl(i, j, t) + w2(1−Dv(i, j, t)) + w3S(j, t) (3.7)
Note that, the greater M does not indicate better performance. M determines the
tradeoff between privacy level and transmission delay.
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Table 3.2: Pseudo Code of the next hop selection algorithm in STPriv
Input: M, P,W[3], m, the dynamic trajectory information of the neighbors
Output: RVID of the next-hop node
1: a = random number between 0 and 1
2: IF (a <= P and m == 0) OR (m ==M):
3: Use the conventional routing algorithm for data transmission
4: m = 0
5: ELSE:
6: RV ID = 0
7: max = 0
8: FOR each valid neighbor:
9: IF (m == 0):
10: Compute the DTD according to Eq 3.3-3.6
11: ELSE:
12: Compute the DTD according to Eq 3.3-3.5 & 3.7
13: IF( max <= DT ):
14: max = DT
15: RVID = Current Neighbors ID
16: Return RVID
Randomized probability of TPriv
BTPriv requests that all the regular messages are routed in the privacy-aware phase
first. Therefore, the target node which always moves between several specific subar-
eas will hardly transmit data through the corresponding local APs. For the global
attacker who is able to obtain statistics regarding APs en route, it will be obvious
that the target node is moving within certain subareas. To address this problem,
STPriv allows the target node to choose the conventional routing phase directly
with a certain probability P . It depends on the number of subareas in the entire
network field.
Our proposed STPriv algorithm is presented in Table 3.2. The velocity of each
node is its average velocity, defined as the change in position divided by elapsed
time. Each node calculates its velocity and stores it locally. The location of each
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node is also available from the self-attached GPS unit. The target node obtains
its neighbors’ location and velocity through query-and-reply, shown in Figure 3.2.
Table 3.2 is the next-hop selection procedure with M-hop STPriv implementation.
The neighbor which has the maximum DT to the target node is selected. Network
administrators or sensor users predefine the system parameters, including the total
number of hops in the privacy-aware routing phase, M , the probability to choose
conventional routing algorithms directly, P , and the weighted vector, W . The max-
imum transmission range and the velocity of mobile nodes depend on the network
application and are also given by network administrators. Current number of hops
for privacy routing phase m is read from the packet header.
3.5 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this section, we present the simulation data to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
design. The simulations are implemented in both small-scale and city-wise networks
to evaluate the generality of the proposed routing protocols.
3.5.1 Simulation Setting
The proposed algorithms were implemented using Python and Matlab on Windows
XP on a 2.13 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU equipped with 2GB of main memory. Exper-
iments are set up in different scales of networks to simulate different applications.
We consider a square area divided into 40X40m2 subareas to represent institution
network fields. The network scale varies among containing 4, 9 and 16 subareas.
Nodes are moving in the manner of random waypoint. Nodes are categorized into
three types according to their trajectory patterns: restricted nodes (moving within
one subarea), repeating node (repeating certain trajectory in some subareas), and
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traversing nodes (randomly traversing the entire network). Nodes are deployed by
given random locations in the network grid and the speed between 0.2 − 22 mph.
We also use a 200X200m2 area within DHDN/3-degree Gauss-Kruger zone 2 (EPSG
code: 31466) to represent part of city-wise network areas. It contains 9 subareas
of interests. The trajectory data of nodes are generated by using the Random
Street model of BonnMotion [Bon]. The weighted vector, W = [0.5, 0.2, 0.3].The
maximum transmission range of each node is set to be 20 m. It is referenced to
the average transmission range for reliable connection in our real experiments on
MEMSIC sensors equipped with MTS420 boards. We conducted 20 independent
rounds of simulations, for each set of parameters. In one round, each data source
node transmits 100 packets. Note that, since we focus on the application and the
network layers, some nodes in the network are set to be dummy nodes, which only
forward packets, to avoid channel collision.
3.5.2 Results and Analysis
Recall the evaluation metrics we defined in section 3.3, we firstly evaluate the per-
formance of our design by computing attackers’ incorrectness value E according to
3.1. The method to define the distance between xut and x
′
ut could vary in different
applications and spaces. In order to have straight forward evaluation results, here
we define the distance between xut and x
′
ut is 0 if and only if xut = x
′
ut . Otherwise,
the distance is 1. Then, we have
E = 1− P (xut|O). (3.8)
Figure 3.3 is the box-and-whisker plot by implementing BTPriv. The data were
collected by considering all the repeating and traversing as target nodes. The mean
of E increases along with the average node density and the network scale. BTPriv
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has less time and power consumption compared to STPriv in terms of the number
of hops for the privacy-aware routing phase. After the node density reaches to the
certain limit, E slightly increases. With the improvements from M-hop STPriv, the
value of E dramatically increases. We simulated 2 to 5 hops of STPriv and com-
pared the results with the performance of BTPriv. The result (mean ± standard
deviation) is shown in Figure 3.4. We use line plot to represent discrete data in
order to get better illustration. The node density in this figure is 1 node/100 m2,
as well as in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.6. It is observed that after M is greater than
3, the performance of STPriv keeps stable. Note that, we have defined p close to
1/2N for choosing conventional routing algorithm. Even though, the stable point
still reaches 81% in 16-subarea network. With 5-hop STPriv implementation, E
is as high as 92.6%. In other words, the adversary fails in locating target nodes
for 92.6% of the time. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show the performance of STPriv in the
city-wise network. The average node speed used in Figure 3.5 is 20 mph (as well
as in Figure 3.7). Similar to small-scale networks, STPriv performs better when M
increases. STPriv also has stable performance when node density and average node
speed vary.
Next, we evaluate the performance of preventing global adversaries by com-
puting the entropy H according to 3.2. The ideal distribution P (X|O) is uniform
distribution. For example, in a 4-sub network, P (X = x′ut|O) = 0.25, ∀x
′
ut ∈ SUB
and the normalized entropy H = 1. Figure 3.7 shows the simulation results in small-
scale networks. For repeating nodes and traversing nodes (Rp & T), BTPriv offers
comparable performance as the ideal distribution. H is as high as 0.999. In Figure
3.7b, STPriv also gives high H value with small M in city-wise networks. This is
due to the randomness of nodes movements. However, more hops in the privacy-
aware routing phase are necessary for hiding trajectory of restricted nodes (R). The
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Figure 3.7: Performance of preventing global adversaries
corresponding normalized entropy is computed and also shown in Figure 3.7. With
greater M , STPriv is also effective to prevent global adversaries in extreme cases.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the eavesdropping attack in mWSNs. We utilized the
trajectory dissimilarity and developed the context-based trajectory privacy-aware
routing protocol to resolve the privacy issue of conventional shortest-path routing
algorithms. We showed the effectiveness of the proposed simulated BTPriv and
STPriv algorithms by simulations in both city-wise and small-scale mWSNs. The
limitations and future directions will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4
UNPREDICTABLE SOFTWARE-BASED ATTESTATION
SOLUTION
In Chapter 3, we investigate the trajectory privacy-aware routing protocol to counter
the external eavesdropping attack. The proposed TPriv algorithm can mislead at-
tackers about target nodes’ locations and bypass suspicious followers. However, in
the presence of node compromise attack, how to protect trajectory privacy from
compromised nodes, which have the authority to access the network secret or pri-
vate information, becomes critical in TPP.
Sensor nodes have inherent constraints such as limited energy, processing ca-
pability and memory space. Additionally, the mobility of sensor nodes offer more
applications in adversarial environments. Hence, mobile sensors are more vulnerable
to node compromise attack than wired or high-powered mobile computing devices.
Hartung et al. demonstrated the process to compromise sensor hardware [HBH05].
Without any prevention solutions or hardware protection, sensor nodes are easily
tampered with and system-critical information can be easily obtained.
Solutions to address node compromise focus on detection and increasing network
resilience. The latter is under the condition that the detection of compromised nodes
has occurred. Most of the previous work is based on misbehavior detection or on
attestation mechanisms [KSE08]. A voting mechanism is designed to detect mis-
behaving nodes based on a neighboring node monitoring mechanism, in which all
nodes within a relative proximity coordinate to determine if a node is compromised
[LZL+06]. For physical attacks, Node redeployment detection is proposed based on
the change of node neighborhood and the change of measured distances between
nodes [SXZC07]. Using mobile agents to detect node compromise in path-based
DoS attacks is proposed in [LB07]. Other hardware solutions, including the utiliza-
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tion of powerful high-end sensors in heterogeneous sensor networks to achieve better
security and performance, were proposed in [Du08]. In this research, the detection
mechanism is required to be in-network operation. In addition, the detection cannot
apply the above existing techniques because mobile nodes do not have fixed posi-
tions or neighborhoods in the network.
Software solutions eliminate the need for excess hardware and are able to per-
form within the power constraints of sensor networks. Software-based ATTestation
for embedded devices (SWATT) [SPvDK04] is an example of software solutions.
SWATT is an external attestation scheme for WSNs using pseudorandom memory
traversal. In SWATT, an external verifier challenges other nodes. A checksum was
computed from the memory contents of the device being challenged. Deviations
from the memory contents referring to an expected value result in the detection of
tampering. Every node in the network will have to perform a memory traversal using
RC4 as the pseudorandom number generator (PRG). Researchers improved SWATT
by decreasing iterations of memory traversal and deployed attestation schemes in
distributed WSNs [YWZC07]. However, these schemes are designed for static sensor
networks, need a large quantity of message transmissions between sensor nodes, and
consume a considerable amount of power.
We propose Unpredictable Software-based Attestation Solution (USAS), provid-
ing both an efficient and effective algorithm based on software attestation tech-
niques, in order to improve the node compromise detection with the consideration
of the large scale and mobility of mobile wireless sensor networks (mWSNs). USAS
eliminates redundancy by reducing the number of nodes performing the RC4 pseu-
dorandom number generation. The selection of the nodes performing the RC4 pseu-
dorandom number generation will be unpredictable. This prevents certain nodes
from being more susceptible to be compromised.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: we describe the system model
and assumptions in Section 4.1. Then we explain the procedures of the proposed
attestation algorithm in Section 4.2. The USAS algorithm simulation and analysis
is presented in Section 4.3, followed by discussions in Section 4.4.
4.1 System Model and Assumptions
USAS can be applied in both infrastructure networks and ad hoc networks. This
work focuses on the applications in infrastructure networks for simplicity. The
mWSN considered is of low cost and is battery powered. Base stations are set up in
proximity regions and are able to connect with mobile sensor nodes under their own
coverage or to communicate with another base station. A base station has the loca-
tion information of each node that is currently in its coverage region. Base stations
also act as network managers, which have access to a centralized database for all
the sensor nodes in the network and are protected by tamper-resistant hardware. In
other words, full awareness of the capability of each node, including the processing
speed and memory capacity is required. This can be achieved by simple registration
before node deployment. It is assumed that the base station is a trustworthy entity
in the mWSN, leaving the base station as the verifier for other nodes.
The network can deploy a multi-level key management system such as LEAP
to prevent basic attacks from outside attackers [ZSJ03]. However, USAS does not
rely entirely on encryption for the security of the communication. Normally, the
nodes close to the base station are more vulnerable since attackers try to focus on
these nodes to compromise more information sent from peripheral nodes. It is very
important to detect any compromised nodes among those that are one hop away
from the base station. Additionally, with the consideration of preventing malicious
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data injection, this work considers that the message transmission from an attested
node to the base station is one hop in two-generation node chains. The relationship
between the I-node and F-node will be discussed in latter section.
It is assumed that the node does not have virtual memory, as is the case with
microcontrollers. The MEGA163L was used in the place of current architecture to
allow for comparisons to be made with previous studies. The specifications for this
microcontroller are as follows: 8 bit processor architecture; 16 KB program memory
and 16 bit Addressing; maximum of 8 million instructions per second (MIPS) [Atm].
USAS allows pseudorandom memory traversals to occur in the order of n lnn in ac-
cordance with the Coupon Collector’s problem [MU05], where n is the number of
memory blocks available. In this case, it is 8K blocks (16X8K).
4.2 USAS Procedures
USAS applies a dynamic node chain which is composed of one Initiator node (I-node)
and multiple Follower nodes (F-nodes) to conduct the attestation. The base station
acts as the external verifier and initializes the attestation. It sends out required
random challenge messages to the I-node. Based on the received message, the I-
node will run RC4 to generate the random access address for computing memory
checksum through random memory traversal. The result will be used as the new
random challenge messages for the next generation, F-nodes, to traverse memory
and compute checksum. These checksum results will be verified by the base station
referring to the checksum of the original registered memory pattern. As long as
the memory is rewritten by attackers to compromise the node, the base station will
detect the differences, therefore, detecting compromised nodes. The detailed USAS
procedures are presented as following subsections in order.
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4.2.1 Memory Space Noise Filling
The memory space of sensor nodes can be classified as program memory and data
memory. After programming a microcontroller, the remaining program space will
be filled with zeros. To prevent compromised nodes from copying the original mem-
ory pattern into remaining memory space to deceive the attestation, the scheme
proposed in [YWZC07] will be used; the remaining program memory will be filled
with pseudorandom number before each node is deployed. Each node has a unique
noise pattern which is derived from a noise generation seed called Su. Different
from [YWZC07], Su will be deleted before deployment. Each node stores the one
way hash function value H(Su) instead of the Su value. A centralized database will
store Su that is able to be accessed by base stations when it is necessary. Noise
patterns for the future authentication and memory traversal of each node will also
be accessible for base stations.
4.2.2 Dynamic Node Attestation Chain
As shown in Figure 4.1, the base station triggers an attestation chain either randomly
or as a result of detecting nodes misbehavior in its coverage region. The base
station will randomly select a node to be an I-node and send this node a challenge,
which includes a random number as a seed for pseudorandom number generation.
Along with this seed, authentication messages for the I-node and other F-nodes are
included. Challenge messages to each F-node are generated by the I-node, including
authentication messages and checksum values computed by the I-node. The design of
dynamic node attestation chains offers the randomness for attestation initialization.
To address node compromise issue in mWSNs, the mobility of nodes and dynamic
network topology need to be considered. Solutions for static WSNs relying on
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Figure 4.1: Message transmissions during the attestation
fixed neighborhood relationships or clustering are not suitable here. USAS applies
attestation solution in mWSNs by temporarily setting up dynamic node attestation
chains based on the real time network topology. In our system model, each node
in the network is freely moving around without a fixed relative location to other
nodes. There is a constraint that USAS only attests nodes one hop from the base
station, for the reason we have discussed in Section 4.1. USAS needs at least three
message transmissions and double memory checksum computations to attest a two-
generation node chain. The attested nodes are required to stay one hop away from
the base station to avoid attestation message missing or malicious data injection by
intermediate nodes. However, the time consumption for checksum computation is
very low. We will present a rough calculation later. Therefore, the impact on node
velocity is trivial. There is a tradeoff between the performance of USAS and power
consumption of the network. With higher power for message transmission, the node
radio range is larger which leads to more attestable nodes in USAS.
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4.2.3 Memory Checksum Computing
For all the attested nodes, message authentication through one way hash function
computing is requested before running the memory traversal function. That is, each
node computes H(Su) upon receiving the challenge message, which includes unique
noise generation seed Su and compares the result with the hash value stored locally.
If these two values are identical, the memory traversal function is triggered.
USAS applies pseudorandom memory traversal. A function accesses program
memory pseudo randomly and loads memory data to compute memory checksum.
In order to traverse memory pseudo randomly, the pseudorandom access address is
needed. USAS designs different methods to generate this address for I-nodes and F-
nodes. Briefly speaking, I-nodes rely on stream cipher computation while F-nodes
do not. Instead, F-nodes utilize the challenge messages from I-nodes directly. I-
nodes generate memory access address by computing a stream cipher (e.g. RC4 is
used as the pseudorandom number generator in SWATT [SPvDK04]) based on the
random number seed included in the challenge message given by the base station.
The processor accesses this address to load an 8-bit memory data block. Therefore,
8 bits of a current checksum are updated in each round by using the previously
computed checksum and performing an XOR operation with the current loaded
memory. As a result, a 64-bit checksum is produced.
F-nodes combine a checksum sent from an I-node with the loaded memory and
the updated checksum from the previous iteration to generate a 16-bit memory
access address. The F-node does not have to perform a stream cipher for each
round of memory traversal. The F-node procedure for memory traversal is shown in
the form of pseudo code in Table 4.1. After the message challenge from the I-node
is authenticated, the F-node uses the checksum value of the I-node as the seed to
traverse its program memory and compute the memory checksum. To be specific, the
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Table 4.1: Pseudo Code F-node Memory Verification
Input: m: number of iterations of the verification procedure
Output: Checksum of memory
Let C be the checksum vector, csfi is the vector of checksum from
I-node, and j be the current index into the checksum vector
1: for i = 1:m
Build address for memory read
2: Aj ← ((csfij
⊕
C(j+1)mod8)≪ 8) + C(j−1)mod8
Update checksum byte
3: Cj ← Cj + (Mem[Aj ]
⊕
C(j−2)mod8 + (csfij
⊕
C(j+1)mod8)i−1)
4: Cj ← rotate left one bit (Cj)
5: j ← (j + 1)mod8 //Update checksum index
6: return C
64-bit checksum is separated into 8 vectors. In the first memory traversal iteration,
each vector is used as the most significant byte of the memory access address. The
least significant byte is a predetermined initial vector. The processor accesses this
16-bit address to load memory data and update the 8-bit checksum. After the
first iteration, the most significant byte of the memory address is randomized by
XORing with the updated 8-bit checksum from another vector computation. The
least significant byte is updated by current loaded memory. This procedure produces
a new 16-bit memory access address for the next iteration. Then the processor loads
the memory data and updates the 8-bit memory checksum. Finally, the F-node
produces a 64-bit checksum and sends it back to the base station.
4.2.4 Checksum Result Verification
The base station uses the same memory traversal seed to compute memory check-
sums based on the original program memory pattern of each node, which is stored in
the centralized database before node deployment, in order to verify the content. Af-
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ter comparing checksum values sent from the F-nodes with the checksum computed
locally, the base station can detect compromised nodes. Although the I-node does
not send its memory checksum back to the base station, the base station can still
detect if the I-node is compromised. Since the checksum of the I-node is used to gen-
erate pseudorandom memory addresses for the F-nodes, a genuine I-node message
will allow F-nodes to compute correct checksums. As long as one F-node sends a cor-
rect response, the I-node and this F-node are considered to be trustworthy because
the lower bound on the checksum collision probability is only 2−64[SPvDK04].
4.3 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this section, we test the effectiveness of USAS by comparing the checksums com-
puted by a compromised node and by the base station. Then we analyze the effi-
ciency of USAS by calculating computation time consumption and node compromise
detection rate.
4.3.1 Memory Traversal Function Testing
In order to test the effectiveness of USAS, simulations were performed for the mem-
ory traversal function procedure of each individual F-node. The input seed checksum
from the I-node was given as the fixed input to the F-node. A 16 KB file was cre-
ated as mock program memory of the F-node for the simulation. For simulating
the compromised node, the program memory layout of the F-node varied from 1-bit
difference to 16 KB difference. The memory traversal function ran 100,000 itera-
tions in each round. For verification, the same checksum computing process ran in
the original mock memory. Figure 4.2 shows the number of bit differences from the
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Figure 4.2: Frequency description of the checksum changes
genuine checksum computed by the base station versus occurrences. The difference
is around the range of 20 to 40 bits even with a few bits change of the memory file.
4.3.2 Computing Improvement Analysis
With the functions available by the MEGA163L microcontroller, we obtain the num-
ber of operations required for proper implementation, as well as the number of clock
cycles. In order to determine clock cycles, an analysis of each function used will
have to be considered. From the microprocessor’s technical document [Atm], F-
nodes take 12 clock cycles in each round to update a checksum value for a single
memory block in USAS. As a comparison, in SWATT, attesting each node takes 23
clock cycles [SPvDK04] in each round. To put this in perspective, for 100,000 iter-
ations of memory traversal, our implementation would take 0.15s assuming 8MIPS
while SWATT would take 0.2875s. USAS decreases memory traversal computation
time of selective nodes (F-nodes) by about 48%. Figure 4.3 shows comparison result
between SWATT and USAS. When the node density is higher, more F-nodes can be
attested in one dynamic node attestation chain; therefore, more computation time
can be reduced.
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Figure 4.3: Computation time comparison based on 100,000 iterations
4.3.3 Node Compromise Detection Rate Analysis
Based on our system model, we derive the detection rate, which is the probability for
base stations successfully verify an F-node. The detection rate for two-generation
chain attestation is considered. Assume that there are n nodes that are one hop
away from multiple base stations in the entire mWSN. The probability for each node
to be compromised is the same.
In compromised nodes, the number of modified memory is mc in bytes out of the
total program memory size m. The probability of base stations detecting program
changes from the checksum result Pch is:
Pch = (1− (
m−mc
m
)m lnm)(1− 2−64). (4.1)
From the view of the network, we need to select a genuine node as the I-node
to detect node compromise successfully. The probability that there are i genuine
nodes among the attestable n nodes is:
Pi =
(
n
i
)
(1− Pc)
iP n−ic , (4.2)
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where Pc is the probability for each node to be compromised. To select one of these
genuine nodes as the I-node, the probability Ps is:
Ps =
i
n
(
n
i
)
(1− Pc)
iP n−ic . (4.3)
We can derive the detection rate Pd from 4.1 to 4.3:
Pd =
n∑
i=k
i
n
(
n
i
)
(1− Pc)
iP n−ic Pch
=
n∑
i=k
i
n
(
n
i
)
(1− Pc)
iP n−ic (1− (
m−mc
m
)m lnm)(1− 2−64), (4.4)
where k is the lower bound of the number of genuine nodes among attested nodes
n. In other words, at most (n − k) nodes are compromised. Here we calculate the
detection rate when k = n/2. Figure 4.4 shows the detection rate when at most half
of the attestable nodes are compromised with different number of attestable nodes,
n = 10, 50, 100, respectively. mc = 100. Pc varies from 0 to 1. When k = 0, it
indicates the ideal detection rate calculated without considering the current status
of the network. Pd ≈ 1 − Pc. From this figure we observe the following: USAS has
good performance in terms of detection rate before Pc = 1−k/n and the performance
does not degrade along with the increase of network scale. It is suitable for large
scale networks. Although we consider Pc and k as independent elements to each
other, in the real network, Pc is the inherent security level of each node, while k
depends on both Pc and network maintenance. The lower probability for each node
to be compromised (Pc) offers higher security level (k) for the network. Therefore,
USAS has high performance in the realistic network status.
4.4 Discussions and Summary
In this chapter, we described the design of USAS to detect compromised nodes in
mWSNs. This internal attack detection algorithm is of great importance to elimi-
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Figure 4.4: Detection rate with k = n/2
nate malicious nodes, therefore, to improve trajectory privacy level of the network.
Based on the assembly code analysis, we simplified the checksum computing for
the F-node compared with SWATT [SPvDK04]. Therefore, the number of clock
cycles for checksum function computation is reduced about 48%. Also, USAS is not
constrained by the assumption that additional ‘if’ statements will detectably slow
down the checksum computation. Furthermore, USAS does not rely on majority
voting mechanisms which are commonly considered in WSNs. One of the draw-
backs of majority voting is the considerable consumption due to the voting message
transmissions and message distribution. In USAS, for verifying each node, only a
few message transmissions are required.
Additionally, the node chain relationship is dynamic and independent in differ-
ent attestations. Not all nodes will be I-nodes or F-nodes at once, yet they can both
store F-node and I-node algorithms since they are very similar. Also, the role of
each node may vary in each attestation. USAS helps to decentralize the network.
By having a decentralized model, an attacker cannot predict which node will be the
I-node. In this way, focusing on attacking a small number of nodes is not helpful
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to compromise the overall network. It reduces the probability of the attestation
message interception and malicious data injection.
Last but not the least, USAS utilizes the powerful base station and combines
with the decentralized network structure to apply node compromise detection in
mWSNs. It does not rely on fixed neighborhood relationships. On the contrary, the
mobility of the nodes benefits node compromise detection in two aspects: 1) the
unpredictable I-node designation and the diffusion of the attestation. 2) Each node
has the possibility of being one hop away from base stations.
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CHAPTER 5
MODELING COOPERATIVE, MALICIOUS AND SELFISH
BEHAVIORS
While some researchers have addressed issues related to TPP in sensor networks, the
autonomy of sensor nodes in decentralized/distributed networks has been generally
overlooked. More and more sensor network applications consist of temporary, on-
the-fly connections among typically autonomous sensing devices where each device
decides whether and to what extent it wishes to participate in the network. In pur-
suit of their own interests, participating devices could therefore misbehave-either by
being selfish or by being malicious. These scenarios necessitate decentralized control
of the network in which sensor nodes make autonomous decisions regarding their
network usage and preserving their trajectory privacy, based on their individual
needs.
We have previously proposed a privacy-aware routing protocol to hide source’s
trajectories in the presence of eavesdropping attacks in chapter 3. It can effectively
mislead the adversary by masking the exact location where a particular packet
started its journey. This algorithm works relying on the cooperation among sensor
nodes. Furthermore, the internal attack is of great importance to be considered
into TPP in mWSNs due to the risk of node compromise. We have developed the
software-based attestation solution to detect internal attacks in chapter 4. The at-
testation relies on the formulation of dynamic attestation tree among peer nodes.
However, in decentralized mWSNs where nodes are autonomous entities, the cooper-
ation among nodes is not guaranteed. In fact, any protocols or techniques involving
cooperation among autonomous nodes need to have the mechanism to consider trust
among nodes. In the context of TPP, it is even more challenging to balance between
resource sharing for cooperation and privacy protection.
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5.1 Related Work Using Game Theory
Game theory is an important tool to model behaviors and strategies of interacting
entities. It has been applied to study the TPP related issues recently. Shokri et
al. used Stackelberg Bayesian game to formalize the mutual optimization of user-
adversary objectives [STT+12]. They aimed to enable system administrators to find
the optimal mechanism for TPP. Humbert et al. studied the problem of designing
mix zones in the presence of local eavesdroppers [HMFH10]. The work proposed
in [CO11, CA12] mainly focused on the incentive designs to provide the required
trajectory privacy level for individual users as well as the desired granularity for
service providers/mobile commerce companies. The above work attempted to ad-
dress the optimal strategies for two competing entities, user-adversary or user-service
provider. There is some other work that has been proposed to study the interactions
between peer nodes. Researchers used game theory to model the cooperation behav-
iors while taking the selfishness of autonomous nodes into consideration in the non-
cooperative network environment [FMHP09, DMNRDSHSH11, KPM11]. In such
networks, each node aims to maximize its own payoff while determining whether it
cooperates TPP activities to gain (or assist other nodes to gain) trajectory privacy.
To study the malice of compromised nodes, researchers have presented comprehen-
sive analysis in intrusion detection games in mobile networks [WCK09, YCM06].
The previous work is of great inspiration in discussing the degree of trust in co-
operation among peer nodes. However, solely considering selfishness or malice is
insufficient for vulnerable networks composed of autonomous nodes.
In this chapter, we formulate in-network TPP activities by applying the Bayesian
game, named the TPP game, to model the cooperation and trust behaviors of au-
tonomous nodes with taking account both selfishness and malice of sensor nodes in
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decentralized/distributed mWSNs. The selfishness is modeled by deploying trajec-
tory privacy sensitivity customization. We analyze the TPP game from static and
dynamic point of views and provide the suggested equilibrium strategy for nodes to
trust neighbors to preserve their trajectory privacy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. An introduction to our TPP
game model is provided in section 5.2, followed by the analysis details in section
5.3, 5.5 and 5.6. Finally, we summarize this work in section 5.7.
5.2 Trajectory Privacy Preservation Game Preliminaries
We aim to investigate the game theoretic approach to model and analyze the co-
operative, selfish and malicious behaviors of autonomous nodes in TPP activities.
Therefore, nodes seeking TPP cooperations can evaluate the degree of trust and
tolerate node compromise attacks in mWSNs.
5.2.1 System and Attack Models
The system we consider is composed of mobile sensor nodes and one or more base
stations/sinks. Nodes are aware of their locations and transmit sensing data (and
spatiotemporal data by needs) through one-hop or multi-hop communications with
the sink and other peer nodes. Access points/gateways, where data are collected
and primarily processed (e. g. basic data cleaning and reduction) before they are
forwarded to the sink, are not restricted in the system. We assume access points
(if they exist) and sinks have adequate transmission and computing capabilities or
necessary hardware units to counter security and privacy attacks. Additionally,
cryptographic techniques are deployed to secure data transmissions.
The adversary is capable of launching an eavesdropping attack. Although proper
cryptographic techniques can prevent such attacks from breaching nodes’ data pri-
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vacy, they are vulnerable when the adversary has certain background knowledge of
the target. Additionally, the adversary can compromise nodes in the network and
launch internal attacks. For instance, compromised nodes are used to track the
target or reveal its trajectories to eavesdroppers or other compromised nodes. This
attack model is set up on top of the attack model in [JPC+12]. We have solely
addressed eavesdropping attacks in the previous work. However, when node com-
promise attack is considered among autonomous sensor nodes, the noncooperative
and malicious nodes behaviors must be studied to cope with the noncooperative
network environment, which is our focus in this work.
5.2.2 Sensitivity Customization
The trajectory privacy sensitivity, noted as sensitivity through this paper, repre-
sents the privacy requirement level of a node in the specific area at particular time.
Sensitivity is determined by both spatial and temporal information.
The network area is divided into small subareas. We categorize subareas into
two types: open areas (OAs) and sensitive areas (SAs) according to the sensitivity
required by a node in different subareas. When the node is traveling in its OAs,
trajectories are relatively open to other network entities and there is no additional
protections besides security techniques. On the other hand, when the node is trav-
eling in its SAs, trajectories need to be highly protected from untrustworthy or
compromised nodes. For example, OAs can be users’ working places since such in-
formation is easy to obtain from public resources in most cases. SAs can be the
restaurants or hospitals that users occasionally visit. The above customization only
involves spatial information which is insufficient in practice. Given an example that
if a user goes to the office after working hours, he/she may want to keep such in-
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formation as privacy which makes that office a SA. Therefore, the sensitivity of an
area needs to be assigned along with the specific time span.
The sensitivity is a customized TPP parameter regarding individual nodes. In
an autonomous network, before nodes join/rejoin the network or while on the move,
users can determine the sensitivity and make the selection on OAs and SAs that
comply with a certain trajectory privacy level θ. θ is defined as the ratio of the
traveling time in SAs over the overall traveling time of each node. The overall trav-
eling time is the life time or a refreshing period of a node. Individual nodes can have
different θ values. However, there is a maximum requirement defined by the network
administrator, denoted as Θ. For example, node i’s trajectory privacy level θi ≤ Θ.
From the individual user’s point of view, greater θ value indicates higher trajectory
privacy. From the network’s point of view, the user’s trajectory privacy level needs
to be limited to Θ since nodes in SAs prioritize their trajectory privacy and may
prefer hiding from any other node rather than cooperating in TPP activities. It
is worth noting that the trajectory privacy level θ of a node does not involve any
private trajectory information. Therefore, neighboring nodes can easily retrieve this
information through queries to peers.
5.3 Trajectory Privacy Preservation Game
The TPP game is conducted between two neighboring nodes, node i and node j, in
the network. Node i is in SAs and needs cooperation from node j in preserving i’s
trajectory privacy during data transmissions. However, node i does not know if node
j will cooperate, defect, or even attack (node j may be an compromised node) due
to the unknown type of node j. We use a Bayesian game formulation to model the
interactions between two nodes in TPP activities. The set of players is N = {i, j}.
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Table 5.1: Payoff matrix of the TPP game
i
j Trust Not Trust
Cooperate Gr − Cp, Gp − Cp Gr, 0
Defect 0,−Cp 0, 0
(a) node j is open, tj = O
i
j Trust Not Trust
Cooperate Gr − Cp −Gθ, Gp − Cp Gr −Gθ, 0
Defect 0,−Cp 0, 0
(b) node j is selfish, tj = S
i
j Trust Not Trust
Cooperate Gr − Cp, Gp − Cp Gr, 0
Attack Gp − CA,−Gp − Cp −CA, 0
(c) node j is malicious, tj =M
i has one type which is a regular node in SAs. That means ti ∈ Ti = {S}. i
can choose whether to trust j in cooperating in TPP activities. Actions available
to i are ai ∈ Ai ={Trust, Not Trust}. j has three types which are regular nodes
in OAs, denoted as Open nodes; regular nodes in SAs, denoted as Selfish nodes,
and Malicious nodes. That means tj ∈ Tj = {O, S,M}. We differentiate selfish
nodes from open nodes to remark that nodes in SAs areas prioritize their trajectory
privacy. Actions available to j are aj ∈ Aj ={Cooperate, Defect, Attack}. Open
nodes and selfish nodes can play either Cooperate or Defect, while malicious can
choose to either Cooperate or Attack. The payoff matrices of the game is presented
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in Table 5.1. Gr denotes the cooperation payoff of j (e.g. cooperative credit gain)
when it cooperates in TPP. Cp is the participation cost. Gp is the trajectory privacy
gain of i when j cooperates.Gθ is the trajectory privacy leakage of j when tj = S and
j cooperates. CA is the cost of a malicious node to Attack. We also denote β as the
attack success rate. Except that the type of j is uncertain to i, other information
is known to each player and both players know this fact. Due to the high priority
of trajectory privacy of selfish nodes, we restrict that Gθ > Gr. Additionally, we
focus on discussing TPP issues in this project. Therefore, we assume that Gp is far
greater than other payoff elements. Cp and CA are comparable and less than other
payoff elements. Next, we present the equilibrium analysis of the TPP game.
5.4 Equilibrium Analysis in the Strategic Form
We begin the equilibrium analysis with considering this TPP game as a static
Bayesian game. We assumed that both players are rational. Their objectives are
to maximize their own expected payoffs. Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) specify
actions or randomized strategies of each type of player, which would be maximizing
the expected payoffs for each player in the strategic form [Mye97]. Therefore, our
equilibrium analysis here is to find existing BNE. In the TPP game, the type of i
is certain to both players and i is uncertain about j’s type. i has the initial belief
about j’s type, which is the probability distribution over all possible types of j. j
is malicious with the probability of (1− P ), selfish with the probability of Pθj and
open with the probability of P (1− θj).
From the payoff matrices of the game, it is not difficult to eliminate some strate-
gies from possible BNE by dominance. Defect is dominated for tj = O and Coop-
erate is dominated for tj = S. j in turn has two possible pure-strategy BNE: σj ∈
{(Cooperate if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Cooperate if tj = M), (Cooperate if tj = O,
Defect if tj = S, Cooperate if tj =M)}.
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• Case 1: σj = (Cooperate if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Cooperate if tj =M).
In this case, the expected payoff of i if σi = Trust is
Ui(T ) = (Gp − Cp)P (1− θj) + (Gp − Cp)(1− P ) + (−Cp)Pθj. (5.1)
(Gp −Cp)P (1− θj) + (Gp −Cp)(1− P ) is the payoff of obtaining cooperation
from j to gain trajectory privacy. (−Cp)Pθj is the payoff when j is selfish and
defects. The expected payoff of i if σi = Not Trust is
Ui(NT ) = 0. (5.2)
Therefore, if 5.1 >5.2, i.e. P < Gp−Cp
Gpθj
, the best response for i is always Trust.
In this case, if tj = M , j will deviate from Cooperate to Attack since j will
breach i’s privacy and get higher expected payoffs. Thus, there is no pure-
strategy BNE when P < Gp−Cp
Gpθj
. If 5.1 <5.2, i.e. P > Gp−Cp
Gpθj
, the best response
for i is always Not Trust. Correspondingly, j’s best response is Cooperate if
tj =M . Hence, (σj, σi) = {(Cooperate if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Cooperate if
tj =M), Not trust} is a possible pure-strategy BNE if P >
Gp−Cp
Gpθj
.
• Case 2: σj = (Cooperate if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Attack if tj =M).
In this case, the expected payoff of i if σi = Trust is
Ui(T ) = (Gp − Cp)P (1− θj) + (−Cp)Pθj
+(−Gp − Cp)(1− P )β + (−Cp)(1− P )(1− β). (5.3)
(−Gp−Cp)(1−P )β is the payoff of being successfully attacked by j. (−Cp)(1−
P )(1 − β) is the payoff when j fails in attacking. The expected payoff of i if
σi =Not Trust is
Ui(NT ) = 0. (5.4)
So if 5.3 <5.4, i.e. P < Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
, the best response for i is always Not
Trust. In this case, if tj = M , j will deviate from Attack to Cooperate to
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get higher expected payoffs. Thus, there is no pure-strategy BNE when P <
Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
. If 5.3 >5.4, i.e. P > Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
, the best response for i is
always Trust. Correspondingly, j’s best response is Attack if tj = M . Hence
(σj , σi) ={(Cooperate if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Attack if tj = M), Trust} is
a possible pure-strategy BNE if P > Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
.
Now we further analyze the conditions under which the pure-strategy BNE exists.
Given 0 < P < 1 and 0 < θj < 1, the condition that P >
Gp−Cp
Gpθj
can establish
is 1 − Cp
Gp
< θj < 1. On the other hand, the condition that P >
Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
can
establish is 0 < θj < 1−
Cp
Gp
. θj is retrieved by j through sending queries to i if there
is no previous local records.
From the above analysis, we can summarize the existence of pure-strategy BNE:
the TPP game has one pure-strategy BNE when P > P0 ∈ {
Gp−Cp
Gpθj
, Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
}.
If 1 − Cp
Gp
< θj < 1, there exists a pure-strategy BNE (σj, σi) = {(Cooperate if
tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Cooperate if tj = M), Not trust} when P >
Gp−Cp
Gpθj
. If
0 < θj < 1−
Cp
Gp
, there exists a pure-strategy BNE (σj , σi) = {(Cooperate if tj = O,
Defect if tj = S, Attack if tj =M), Trust} when P >
Gpβ+Cp
Gp(1−θj)+Gpβ
. This conclusion
verifies that in order to have stable status that encourages cooperation among nodes
in TPP activities, θj needs to be restricted to an upper bound of Θ.
We have analyzed the pure-strategy BNE of the TPP game. However, under
pure strategies, i either cannot gain trajectory privacy by trusting other nodes or
can frequently be attacked by malicious nodes where high expected payoffs encourage
malicious nodes to attack. Therefore, we need to find the mixed-strategy BNE of
the TPP game. Such BNE exists when P < P0. Let φ be the probability of σi =
Trust. Let ψ be the probability of σj = Attack when tj = M . The mixed-strategy
BNE is derived as follows. The expected payoffs of i when σi = Trust and when
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σi = Not Trust are respectively:
Ui(T ) = (Gp − Cp)P (1− θj) + (−Cp)Pθj + (1− ψ)(Gp − Cp)(1− P )
+ψ(1− P )((−Gp − Cp)β + (−Cp)(1− β)). (5.5)
Ui(NT ) = 0. (5.6)
The expected payoffs of j when σj = Cooperate and when σj = Attack are respec-
tively:
Uj(C) = (Gr − Cp)φ+Gr(1− φ). (5.7)
Uj(A) = (Gp − CA)φβ + (−CA)φ(1− β) + (−CA)(1− φ). (5.8)
To derive a mixed-strategy BNE, j’s attacking rate needs to satisfy Ui(T ) = Ui(NT )
if tj = M . Thus, j’s equilibrium strategy is to attack with probability ψ
∗ =
Gp(1−Pθj)−Cp
Gp(1−P )(1+β)
. Similarly, i’s equilibrium strategy is to trust with probability φ∗ =
Gr+CA
Gpβ+Cp
. The static TPP game has a mixed-strategy BNE when (σj , σi) =(Cooperate
if tj = O, Defect if tj = S, Attack with probability ψ
∗ if tj = M , Trust with proba-
bility φ∗).
5.5 Dynamic TPP Game and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Thus far, we have analyzed the one-stage TPP game. The challenge of applying
such a game model is assigning i a proper initial belief of j’s type. In mWSNs,
nodes are highly distributed. Relying on the centralized administrator to provide
the regular nodes’ rate P is costly. Therefore, i needs to dynamically update its
belief of j’s type in a distributed manner in the multi-stage TPP game.
5.5.1 Belief System
We consider a dynamic Bayesian game which is a repeated one-stage TPP game
with no discount factor to model the multi-stage TPP game. The game is infinite
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since players cannot predict when neighboring nodes leave the network. The static
TPP game is repeated in each time slot. We continue to use notations in the static
TPP game with minor revisions. aj(t) denotes j’s action at stage t. a˜j(t) denotes
i’s observation of j’s action. i observes j’s actions with the observation rate αt,
the action false active rate γt and the attack false alarm rate βt. Additionally, let
µi(tj |htj) be i’s belief of j, where h
t
j is the action history profile j at the beginning of
stage t, i.e. htj = (aj(0), aj(1), ..., aj(t− 1)). Given j’s action history profile h
t
j and
type tj , P (aj(t)|ti, htj) is the probability that aj(t) is observed at stage t. Based on
Bayes’ rule, i’s posterior belief of j is calculated by:
µi(tj|(h
t
j , a˜j(t))) =
µ(tj|(htj))P (a˜j(t)|h
t
j, tj)∑
t˜j∈Tj µi(t˜j |h
t
j)P (a˜j(t)|h
t
j , t˜j)
. (5.9)
where µi(t˜j|htj) > 0. In our game model, with an altering of notation, we have the
following:
P (a˜j(t) = Cooperate|tj = O) = αt(1− βt)
P (a˜j(t) = Defect|tj = O) = 1− αt
P (a˜j(t) = Attack|tj = O) = αtβt
P (a˜j(t) = Cooperate|tj = S) = γt(1− βt)
P (a˜j(t) = Defect|tj = S) = 1− γt
P (a˜j(t) = Attack|tj = S) = γtβt
P (a˜j(t) = Cooperate|tj =M) = αt(1− βt)(1− ψ)
P (a˜j(t) = Defect|tj =M) = 1− αt
P (a˜j(t) = Attack|tj =M) = αt(ψ + (1− ψ)βt)
(5.10)
Formula 5.9 and 5.10 form the belief system [Osb04] for i to update its belief of
j as the game is played sequentially. With both this belief system and the initial
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belief that i holds, i is able to compute updated belief. It is worth noting that in
applications requiring high trajectory privacy levels, i can apply the Grim Trigger
strategy once an attack is observed. However, keeping a dynamic updated belief on
all types of nodes for further possible cooperation is plausible in sparse networks.
5.5.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
We have found BNE of the static TPP game in previous sections. However, when
the game involves sequential multiple stages, Nash Equilibrium needs to be strength-
ened with the notion of subgame perfection. The relevant notion of equilibrium will
be PBE. PBE requires each player’s strategy to specify optimal actions, given the
player’s beliefs and the strategies of all other players, and the beliefs are consistent
with Bayes’ Rule whenever it is applicable. It specifies a feasible strategy profile
for players to optimize the expected payoffs in the multi-stage game. We now show
that there exist PBE in the dynamic TPP game.
We first prove that the proposed dynamic TPP game satisfies the Bayesian con-
dition B(i)-B(iv) and P [FT91]. Then we determine the PBE in such games.
Lemma 5.5.1 The proposed dynamic TPP game satisfies Bayesian conditions B(i)-
B(iv) and P:
B(i): Posterior beliefs are independent, and all types of player i have the same
beliefs.
B(ii): Bayes’ rule is used to update beliefs whenever possible.
B(iii): Players do not signal what they do not know.
B(iv): Posterior beliefs are consistent for all nodes with a common joint distribution
on the type of another player given ht.
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P: For each player i, type ti, player i’s alternative strategy σ
′
i and history h
t,
Ui(σ|h
t, ti, µ(· |h
t)) ≥ Ui((σ
′
i, σ−i)|h
t, ti, µ(· |h
t)). (5.11)
Proof. B(i) is satisfied because i only has one type. The proposed belief update
system was derived according to Bayes’ rule. Thus, B(ii) is satisfied. B(iii)is satisfied
because j’s signal is j’s action which is observed by i, and B(iv) is satisfied since
this is a two-player game.
According to the rationality of the players, given i’s updated belief of j, µi(tj |htj),
and htj, i’s optimal behavior strategy σ
∗
i is to maximize his expected payoff based
on i’s belief. Therefore, σ∗i satisfies:
Ui(σj , σ
∗
i )|h
t
j , ti, µi(tj |(h
t
j, aj(t))) ≥ Ui((σj, σ
′
i|h
t
j, ti, µi(tj|(h
t
j , aj(t))). (5.12)
Similarly, j’s optimal behavior strategy σ∗j satisfies:
Uj(σ
∗
j , σi)|h
t
i, tj , µj(ti|(h
t
i, ai(t))) ≥ Uj((σ
′
j , σi|h
t
i, tj, µj(ti|(h
t
i, ai(t))). (5.13)
σ′ denotes the alternative strategy of the player. In this two-player game, formula
5.12 and 5.13 show the sequential rationality of each player, which satisfies P.
In this paragraph, we derive the PBE of the dynamic TPP game. At stage t, recall
φ denotes the probability of σi = Trust and ψ denotes the probability of σj = Attack
when tj =M .
Ui(ai(t) = T ) = (Gp − Cp)µi(tj = O|h
t
j) + (−Cp)µi(tj = S|h
t
j)
+(1− ψ)(Gp − Cp)µi(tj =M |h
t
j)
+ψ(µi(tj =M |h
t
j)((−Gp − Cp)β + (−Cp)(1− β)). (5.14)
Ui(ai(t) = NT ) = 0. (5.15)
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Uj(aj(t) = C) = (Gr − Cp)φ+Gr(1− φ). (5.16)
Uj(aj(t) = A) = (Gp − CA)φβ + (−CA)φ(1− β) + (−CA)(1− φ). (5.17)
This mixed-strategy equilibrium needs to satisfy the condition that different strate-
gies cannot be differentiated by each player from the expected payoffs. Therefore,
we derive the PBE pair based on the equivalence of equations 5.14 and 5.15, and
the equivalence of 5.16 and 5.17. Thus, we have the following:
ψ∗t =
Gp(1− (1− µi(tj =M |htj))θj)− Cp
Gpµi(tj =M |htj)(1 + β)
φ∗t =
Gr + CA
Gpβ + Cp
. (5.18)
We now discuss the existence of pure-strategy PBE. In the case that 5.14 >5.15,
i always plays Trust and j always plays Attack. In this case ψ∗t satisfies ψ
∗
t <
Gp(1−(1−µi(tj=M |h
t
j))θj)−Cp
Gpµi(tj=M |htj)(1+β)
and ψ∗t = 1. The condition for such a case to exist is that
µi(tj = M |htj) <
Gp(1−θj)−Cp
Gp(1+β−θj)
and θj < 1 −
Cp
Gp
. Similarly, the pure-strategy pair
of i always plays Not Trust and malicious j always plays Cooperate exists under
the condition that µi(tj = M |htj) <
Gp(θj−1)+Cp
Gpθj
and θj > 1 −
Cp
Gp
, which does not
hold in this TPP game model. Therefore, there exists one pure-strategy PBE pair
(ψ∗t = 1, φ
∗
t = 1) when µi(tj = M |h
t
j) <
Gp(1−θj)−Cp
Gp(1+β−θj)
and θj < 1−
Cp
Gp
. In sum, given
the belief µi(tj|(h
t
j, aj(t))) which can be derived by equation 5.9, the PBE pair for
the dynamic TPP game is (ψ∗t , φ
∗
t ).
5.6 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this section, we provide simulation results to illustrate the properties of equi-
librium strategies in the dynamic TPP game. We implement PBE strategies in
mobile nodes. Nodes are moving in the 200X200 m2 area within DHDN/3-degree
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Gauss-Kruger zone 2 (EPSG code: 31466). Nodes’ trajectories are generated by
using the Random Street model of BonnMotion [Bon]. The maximum transmis-
sion range of each node is set to be 40 m, referenced to the average maximum
transmission range in our real experiments on MEMSIC sensors equipped with
MTS420 boards. The default values of the payoff matrix and system parameters are
Gp = 50, Gr = 5, Cp = 1, CA = 2, P = 0.2, αt = 0.8, β = 0.9, βt = 0.2, γt = 0.2.
We first analyze the probability for a node to play Trust in the two-node dy-
namic TPP game. Figure 5.1 shows that when attackers have a higher successful
attacking rate, users need to decrease trust. The trajectory privacy gain Gp has
more obvious impact on trust. When Gp has greater values, it indicates that the
user weighs trajectory privacy more critically and also encourages the attacker to
attack more frequently. Therefore, users’ trust of others dramatically decreases.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the node i’s belief update and node j’s corre-
sponding attacking rate when consecutive Attacks are observed by i in each stage t.
θj = 0.5. The figures suggest that regardless the initial belief that i holds, observing
consecutive Attacks gives a very fast convergence of i’s belief that j is a malicious
node. As a result, the attacker has to reduce the attacking rate fast. These results
are obtained when we assume that two nodes are always one-hop neighboring nodes.
As a comparison, Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the belief update and attacking
rate when the malicious node plays Attack rationally according to its PBE strategy.
The data are collected from different scenarios where the malicious nodes A and
B have different trajectory similarities with i. Trajectories of node i, A and B are
illustrated in Figure 5.4. Node A is always closely following i and node B is i’s
one-hop neighbor in half of the time. The result is based on the average value from
1,000 iterations. i’s belief of node A converges slightly slower compared with the
results in Figure 5.2 because node A also plays Cooperate and Attack is observed less
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frequently. Node A’s attacking rate also reduces slower in order to gain more payoffs
by attacking in longer time. i’s belief of node B converges much slower because at
some stages the TPP game cannot be conducted. In this case, the belief remains
the same as the previous stage.
Finally, we simulate a mWSN composed of 200 mobile nodes and analyze the
network trajectory privacy gain under different strategies of the nodes seeking TPP
cooperation. There are 40 malicious nodes and 160 regular nodes, including selfish
nodes and open nodes. Each regular node randomizes its trajectory privacy level
with the upper boundary at Θ = 0.7. Malicious nodes are programmed to play
the PBE strategy. Regular nodes are programmed to play one of the following
three strategies: the pure strategy, always Trust; the mixed BNE strategy; and
the PBE strategy respectively. The results are presented in Figure 5.7 and Figure
5.8. We show the average data based on 10 groups of trajectory data and 1,000
iterations for each group. When regular nodes playing mixed BNE strategy, both
regular nodes and attackers get low average payoffs in the actual game within 20
stages. This is because the mixed strategy suggests regular nodes a fair probability
to play Trust no matter how malicious nodes act. This strategy neither encourages
nor discourages malicious nodes to Attack. On the other hand, if regular nodes
always play Trust, it greatly encourages malicious nodes to Attack. Therefore, this
pure strategy gives very high average payoffs to the attacker. Although malicious
nodes follow the PBE strategy and reduce the attacking rate gradually, regular
nodes get high average payoffs by always getting cooperation from open nodes.
Finally, when both players follow the PBE strategy pair, regular nodes get even
higher average payoffs but malicious nodes’ payoffs dramatically reduce along with
the belief convergence. This is because regular nodes take actions according to the
dynamically updated beliefs of other peer nodes. The PBE strategy allows regular
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nodes to catch more opportunities to Trust open nodes to gain trajectory privacy
while often playing Not Trust with malicious nodes.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we revisited the trust issue in TPP cooperation. We formulated
TPP activities as a two-player Bayesian game and modeled cooperative, selfish and
malicious nodes’ behaviors in the TPP game. The game was analyzed in both
strategic and dynamic forms. We derived the pure and mixed strategies in the BNE
and PBE, respectively. We suggested the trust degree for mobile nodes seeking
TPP cooperation. The limitations and future directions will be discussed in the
next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSIONS, FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
This dissertation described an in-network TPP framework that incorporates the
trajectory privacy-aware routing protocol design, the internal attack detection al-
gorithm development, nodes’ behavior mathematical modelling and performance
evaluations. This chapter reflects the contributions, discusses the limitations and
future work, and concludes.
6.1 TPriv: Privacy-aware Routing Protocol to Prevent Ex-
ternal Attacks
We designed the TPriv to prevent the eavesdropping attack in mWSNs, where at-
tackers may deploy static eavesdroppers near APs to estimate mobile nodes’ trajec-
tories. We defined the passive trajectory privacy attack model in mWSNs. Based
on our network model, we presented TPriv, including BTPriv and M-hop STPriv,
to hide the trajectory of data source nodes from privacy adversaries. We defined
the proper evaluation metrics to evaluate the trajectory privacy performance of the
above methods. The effectiveness was presented by simulation results.
One limitation of TPriv is the extra power consumption for query-and-reply
during the privacy-aware routing phase. Although the development of both micro-
computing and nanotechnology is resolving the power issue to a large extent, real
applications are still lagging. One possible improvement is to embed this query-
and-reply operation into route discovery. In this case, one-time pad VID can be im-
plemented during route discovery in mWSNs where the network topology is highly
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dynamic. However, the lifetime of VID needs to be redesigned to comply with the
lifetime of routes.
6.2 USAS: Software-based Attestation Solution to Detect
the Internal Attack
We designed the USAS to protect trajectory privacy in the presence of the inter-
nal attack. We applied software-based attestation to detect compromised nodes
in mWSNs. We have simulated the promising USAS and shown the effectiveness
for detecting any falsification of program memory of sensor nodes. By deploying
the dynamic node attestation chains, the attestation computation time and power
consumption are improved from the previous work. With the unpredictable I-node
designation, the security level of mWSNs is increased.
We have thus far only considered nodes one hop away from base stations here.
However, with the proper design of the dynamic node chain and the number of gen-
erations, USAS could be applied in multi-hop communications in the entire mWSN.
Another improvement is to relax the responsibility of the base station and adapt
USAS into more distributed network architectures.
6.3 TPP Game: Modeling Cooperative, Malicious and Self-
ish Nodes’ Behaviors
We applied Bayesian game theory to model nodes’ behaviors in TPP activities in
mWSNs. We formulated the characteristics of autonomous nodes, including selfish,
malicious and cooperative, in the TPP game, and evaluated the trustworthiness of
82
the unknown type node. The equilibrium strategies of the game have been derived
and analyzed in theory and simulation results.
In the current TPP game model, the post-detection strategy has not been dis-
cussed here. For example, the regular node can take the Grim Trigger strategy to
cut off any cooperation once it observes an Attack from a node or has 100 percent
belief in a node’s malice. Another direction to improve this work is to specify the
landscape and combine it with the sensitivity customization. If done, the generality
of this framework will be degraded with the tradeoff to gain higher performance
payoff by avoiding seeking cooperation from selfish nodes. Additionally, the current
framework is restricted by the two-node game, which cannot be applied to TPP
techniques that require multiple entities to cooperate in TPP activities.
6.4 Future Directions
Regardless of the above improvements, there are other potential directions to en-
hance the current work and develop a more comprehensive TPP framework.
6.4.1 A Context-based Trajectory Data Model
The context-based trajectory data model is aimed to illustrate the physical, spa-
tiotemporal, symbolic, absolute, relative or uncertain context of trajectories in
mWSNs. To generate this model, there are two tasks that need to be done: trans-
form spatiotemporal instances into the basic context-based trajectories; and balance
the tradeoffs between trajectory privacy, cost and data accuracy that result from
the degree of uncertainty and granularity of trajectory data.
As we noted earlier, the current trajectory data model is defined as an ordered
list of location samples at specific instances in time [GS05]. From this list, the
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movement of the object is inferred and information is provided for LBS. However, a
more thorough description, representation and manipulation of trajectory modeling
could provide a more physical, symbolic, absolute or relative context, which in turn
could aid in privacy protection. For example, when analyzing a single trajectory, a
low-active pattern of movement within a certain area, the sudden appearance of an
outlier, or high frequency of querying for the same online service, may imply that an
adversary is trying to survey other users. Besides examining a single trajectory, this
model need to consider trajectories with certain spatial and temporal relations (such
as co-location in space, co-existence in time, lagged co-incidence, etc.). For example,
a high correlation between the trajectories of neighboring nodes could imply that
one or multiple nodes are potential malicious followers. These scenarios illustrate
the benefits of incorporating context trajectory information into TPP mechanisms.
The trajectory model can incorporate trajectory context information using var-
ious techniques including integrating the network’s scene knowledge [WTG06], the
attributes of moving carriers, and trajectory uncertainty into the trajectory context
information. Scene knowledge (e.g. roads, entrances, exits, bus stops, buildings)
provides the background knowledge for realistic trajectory segmentation, i.e., in
order to develop a trajectory segmentation method, which efficiently detects suspi-
cious attacks, we must embed scene knowledge into the method. For example, a
high correlation between two trajectories on the freeway should not be considered
suspicious. On the other hand, a high correlation between two trajectories, in a
particular small field or building, should be considered suspicious. Attributes of a
moving carrier (e.g. size, velocity, shape, sound) can be used to identify users in
heterogeneous networks. For example, an outlier in a cluster should not be consid-
ered a compromised node if the outlier is identified to be an ambulance as a result
of its emergency siren.
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To balance the tradeoffs between trajectory privacy, the cost associated with the
data sampling rates and the accuracy of the data, application-dependent trajectory
uncertainty needs to be defined, analyzed and evaluated. The inherent uncertainty
of trajectory data is primarily due to sensors’ physical and technical capabilities,
which limit the performance of the data collection and storage processes. On one
hand, accurate data at detailed levels of granularity is preferred for data collection,
management and analysis for services. On the other hand, less accurate and coarse
granularity [EE07] of spatiotemporal data is necessary for preventing privacy attacks
and is less expensive. Furthermore, the attributes of a moving carrier can reveal the
identity of the carrier. Therefore, a method to properly define the granularity levels
of trajectory data must be developed.
In applications of mWSNs involving trajectory-based services, the trajectory
granularity requirements of a service provider/administrators and adversaries would
typically be different. Service providers/administrators require synoptic informa-
tion, while attackers are interested in elementary information. Given this distinc-
tion, we would first develop different trajectory granularity levels for different entities
in the network. To do so, we must first find solutions to the following open ques-
tions: What trajectory data are needed by the service provider/administrators?
What information is most critical for an adversary attempting a trajectory pri-
vacy breach? We must also define an appropriate trajectory granularity level that
meets the requirements of service providers/administrators without releasing sen-
sitive data. Furthermore, in the course of trajectory data interpolation, sample
suppression and compression, we must balance the tradeoff between sending critical
information to service providers/administrators and risking the release secret infor-
mation to potential attackers. Last, we must develop an approach to compute and
evaluate the similarity between an educated trajectory guess and the real trajectory,
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so that we can determine the threshold of the suppression/compression limit. Once
we accomplish these goals, we will develop a trajectory data model that properly
defines trajectory granularity and uncertainty levels.
Our current work, the context-based trajectory privacy-aware routing protocol,
is limited in that it is based solely on the dissimilarity context of trajectories. Fur-
thermore, we have yet to define an optimal granularity that allows accurate data
transmissions and prevents attackers from tracking the target node. If a context-
based trajectory data model were developed and the context of trajectories were
known, then suspicious trajectories of sensors (e.g. sensors that reside around a
data gathering point for prolonged periods) could help detect potential attackers.
Such information could then be used to build up basic trust for private data trans-
missions among neighboring sensors, which would also lead to less power consump-
tion. Moreover, trajectories with properly defined granularity and uncertainty levels
could prevent undetected attackers from reconstructing valid trajectories of the tar-
get. A context-based trajectory data model will fundamentally enrich the definition
of trajectory and provide the groundwork for the further development of TPP mech-
anisms.
6.4.2 A Lightweight Energy-efficient Secure Framework
The lightweight energy-efficient secure framework is a comprehensive framework
which integrates overhead and power-consumption optimization, security techniques
and the TPP mechanisms.
The major constraints of mobile sensor nodes are limited storage and power sup-
port. Therefore, lightweight energy-efficient algorithms are preferred in TPP and
security algorithm designs. This framework needs to consider the inherent limita-
tions and characteristics of mWSNs. It will utilize the existing overhead and power
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consumption optimization techniques and security techniques to benefit the com-
prehensive network performance and build up a robust mWSN.
Due to the inherent characteristics of online algorithms, limited trajectory data
storage needs to provide adequate trajectory information, such as historical and
multiple trajectories, for online analysis and manipulation. Therefore, trajectory
compression is a very promising field for developing a lightweight system framework
in terms of efficient data storage utilization. Moreover, the uncertainty caused by
compression can also benefit trajectory privacy protection.
Lightweight design can only extend sensors’ lifetime to some extent. Further
power consumption optimization is necessary. Therefore, we suggest a cross-layer
localization system to assist in trajectory privacy protection. Thus far, we have
overlooked the advantages of utilizing the lower layers to collect relative location
information. One improvement is to deploy Cognitive Radio (CR)-based sensor net-
works. By deploying additional sensors for spectrum sensing, Dynamic Spectrum
Access (DSA) can be enabled in sensor networks, where secondary users are allowed
to operate in spectrum bands allocated to primary users on a non-interfering ba-
sis [CGCC07]. CR technology has great potential to enhance the performance of
sensor networks in terms of extending the transmission range without increasing
transmission power [CDWC08]. By applying this model, energy consumption will
dramatically decrease.
Furthermore, privacy-aware routing algorithms will be collaborated with lower
layers, which can be used to provide location information. There are techniques
based on Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI), radio hop count, Time Differ-
ence of Arrival (TDoA), Angle of Arrival (AoA), which accurately orient nodes with
respect to a global coordinate system. In our system, these localization techniques
will be used to sense trajectory information of neighbors in range in a privacy-aware
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manner. Combined with the DSA operation, this cross-layer model will serve as the
basis of the energy-efficient trajectory privacy-aware localization system.
As a comprehensive framework for mWSNs, it is inevitable to consider security
issues in the system due to the high vulnerability of sensors in unattended envi-
ronments. Moreover, many security techniques can be used to protect trajectory
privacy. We will begin with integrating security techniques, in particular, authenti-
cation and node identity encryption, into TPP to improve the security level under a
variety of security attacks. Authentication is aimed to securely identify the entities
in the network and prevent external online trajectory privacy attacks. Node identity
encryption is a straightforward solution to hide node identities among untrustwor-
thy peer nodes. The challenge is to develop a lightweight distributed cryptographic
mechanism to make the node identities untraceable for the adversary while synchro-
nized with the administration entity. Encryption synchronization between nodes and
the administration entity is important and necessary, as the administrator needs to
trace back node identities for the purposes of communications and intrusion attack
detection. When a powerful adversary monitors the traffic flow all over the network,
the security techniques above are of great importance to integrate into the system
to achieve better security protection.
Furthermore, considering that the value of private information largely relies on
the roles that describe users’ functionalities in organizations and communities, we
will provide the role-based service customization mechanism in this comprehensive
framework. Next, the framework will be able to dynamically adjust the privacy re-
quirements based on different users’ roles, which is of great importance in the sense
that users are generally identified by multiple roles in different trajectory contexts.
Meanwhile, improper privacy breach behaviors of authorized users could also be
detected, which is a crucial misbehavior detection method to internal attacks.
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6.4.3 Privacy Preservation Features and Challenges in GeoSNs
En route to the current stage of the study, we realize the important extension of TPP
in GeoSNs, along with the fast spreading of GeoSNs. Mobile devices are developed
in the current of combining multiple functions of sensing environments, collecting
information, processing data, communicating, entertaining and socializing. In this
future, we would like to investigate the TPP issue in GeoSNs.
TPP in GeoSNs is particularly important to social network users due to the
fact that trajectory information available from GeoSNs is always associated with
users’ social activities and such activities can be easily identified from public or
semi-public resources, such as urban patterns [FRMZ11], open social events and
interactions among users. As we reviewed in Chapter 2, trajectory privacy was not
considered in the original design of GeoSNs and there exists a tremendous leakage.
There is an ungent need to develop TPP techniques in GeoSNs.
As summarized in [VFBJ11], GeoSNs have several features in the inherent set-
tings which may render existing TPP techniques in LBS and databases to be di-
rectly applied. 1) Some applications, such as check-ins, require exact locations
with high granularity. 2) Some applications require “real-time” response, such as
proximity services. 3) Users could be tagged passively, such as in photo posts and
co-location check-ins. 4) Users could be re-identified through linking available back-
ground knowledge and external information.
In addition, we would like to emphasize the following two aspects: 1) The massive
interaction among users could be a resource of trajectory privacy leakage. Regard-
less of passive tagging by friends or group members, users might reveal their trip
plans or daily routines during the interaction with friends. Although the involved
friends maybe trustworthy, the access to such interaction is commonly ignored by
users. 2) Profiles of the same user from multiple GeoSN applications might lead
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to a clear “picture” of the user for re-identification. Active social network users
likely join more than one GeoSNs. Although users may be aware of privacy and
set privacy preferences carefully, it is very possible for attackers to link information
from multiple GeoSN accounts and extract more characteristics of the target.
As indicated in the existing literature [FRVM+10, VFBJ11], TPP in GeoSNs
need to consider location privacy, absence privacy and co-location privacy. As the
conclusion of this section, we summarize the challenges in terms of connections that
need to be considered in the design of TPP techniques in GeoSNs as follows:
• The connection among users – It includes the social relationships and the
interaction among users during online social activities, as we discussed above.
• The connection between the social pattern and available traces – As an en-
tity in society, participating in social activities is very common, which forms
the certain pattern in corresponding environments. On the other hand, it is
possible to infer private trajectory information from available traces and the
social pattern.
• The connection among different GeoSNs and other online service sites – This
is an issue which has been ignored in the existing literature. However, it is a
possible and effective method for attackers to obtain private data since most
of the online sites require users to register services by a unique identification,
and many users use the same identity for registration, such as email accounts
and phone numbers. Particularly, collecting information from multiple sites,
facilitated by effective searching engines, like Google and Bing, is cost-efficient
in terms of time and energy consumption. Moreover, different access control
policies provided by a variety of GeoSNs hinder effective preservation methods.
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• The connection between the geographic map and available traces – This is a
consistent issue to consider along with TPP in different applications. However,
in GeoSNs, the geographic map could contain rich social contexts. Combining
background knowledge and social contexts may distinguish the target from
other users who have similar available traces. For example, there is an art ex-
hibition in the museum, which is located near a church, on Sunday morning.
It is likely that an art student is going to the museum and a religious person
is going to the church, given that they are both heading to this region. Ge-
ographic maps associated with social contexts may further ease the inference
of users’ private trajectories.
6.5 Conclusion
The vast applications of location-aware mobile sensing devices will accomplish se-
vere missions in human-unattainable environments, as well as bring significant con-
venience to our daily lives. However, these applications will remain elusive unless
the trajectory privacy of mobile nodes is properly protected from unauthorized en-
tities. This dissertation stemmed from the urgent need of TPP mechanisms and
described an in-network TPP framework in mWSNs. The framework designed the
TPriv routing protocol to prevent the external attack, developed the USAS algo-
rithm to detect the internal attack, applied Bayesian game theory to model nodes’
behaviors and evaluated the trust degree in TPP cooperations. We hope the future
applications of mobile sensing devices will benefit from our research outcomes and
our study will inspire better privacy preservation solutions.
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